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Mapping a Surge of Disinformation in Africa

Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 13 (2024)

"Disinformation campaigns have targeted every region of the continent. At least 39 African countries have been the target of a specific disinformation campaign. Disinformation tends to be concentrated. Half of the countries subjected to disinformation (20 of the 39) have been targeted three or more ... times, up from just seven countries meeting that threshold in 2022. African countries experiencing conflict are subject to much greater levels of disinformation—facing a median of 5 campaigns– highlighting the connection between instability and disinformation. Countries confronting disinformation typically face multiple disinformation actors. At times, these actors amplify one another’s misleading narratives, while at others, they clash or stay in separate lanes. Nearly 60 percent of disinformation campaigns on the continent are foreign state-sponsored—with Russia, China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar as the primary sponsors. Russia continues to be the primary purveyor of disinformation in Africa, sponsoring 80 documented campaigns, targeting more than 22 countries. This represents nearly 40 percent of all disinformation campaigns in Africa. These 80 campaigns have reached many millions of users through tens of thousands of coordinated fake pages and posts. Aggressively leveraging disinformation is a mainstay of Russia’s use of irregular channels to gain influence in Africa. Russia has promulgated disinformation to undermine democracy in at least 19 African countries, contributingto the continent’s backsliding on this front. African elections provide prime opportunities for disinformation. Some employ mercenary disinfo-ops teams. One private Israeli group, dubbed “Team Jorge,” has reportedly implemented disinformation campaigns to disrupt over 20 African elections since 2015. Domestic actors have also increasingly integrated disinformation into their political playbooks, notably during Kenya’s 2022 and Nigeria’s 2023 election. African countries that uphold presidential term limits (i.e., those with stronger checks and balances) are less exposed to foreign sponsored disinformation, with an average of 1.5 campaigns compared to an average of over 3 campaigns for countries without term limits. This underscores the common aim of foreign disinformation to prop up authoritarian actors." (Highlights) more

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Desinformación al descubierto: Aprendizajes, retos y recomendaciones

Kirvin Larios

Fundación Gabo; Proyecto Desconfío (2024), 36 pp.

"Echando mano de ejemplos de buenas prácticas y de casos de proyectos especializados que se ubican en la primera línea contra la desinformación, esta guía propone una conversación, necesaria y urgente, a partir de una selección de lo sucedido en la edición 2023 de la Cumbre Global sobre Desin ... more

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“We don’t believe in [the] Coronavirus; we believe in Allah. Whatever happens, it happens from Allah”: Pakistani media’s response to countering conspiracy theories during the COVID-19 pandemic

Madeeha Naz, Amir Hamza Marwan

Newspaper Research Journal, volume 46, issue 1 (2024), pp. 6-28

"This study examines the coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic by the four leading newspapers of Pakistan—Dawn, The News, Daily Times and The Nation—when they were responsible for informing and educating the public during a health crisis hit by conspiracy theories. The researchers utilized content a ... more

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Mitigating the Risks of Political Microtargeting: Guidance for Policymakers, Civil Society, and Development Cooperation
Deep Insights

Key Guides

Jacob Kröger, Emilia Errenst, Niklas Nau et al.

Bonn; Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) (2024), 63 pp.

"Digital technology has revolutionized how political ads are delivered and consumed, giving political campaigns increased possibilities to target and tailor their messaging to specific audiences—a practice known as political microtargeting (PMT). While PMT has potential benefits for society, it al ... more

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How to spot harmful information in crises

London: CDAC Network (2024), 2 pp.

"In times of emergency, finding reliable information online can be challenging. This guide offers practical advice to help you identify trustworthy information and avoid misinformation. By asking the right questions and using the tools provided, you can make informed decisions even during a crisis." ... more

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Religión y pandemia: Rumores y narrativas conspiracionistas en Facebook

Margarita Zires Roldan, Margarita Reyna Ruiz

Ciências Sociais e Religião (Campinas), volume 26, issue e024006 (2024), 32 pp.

"Este artigo apresenta os resultados de uma investigação sobre os rumores e as narrativas conspiratórias que circularam em 2020 sobre a pandemia em duas páginas do Facebook pertencentes a dois grupos religiosos: um evangélico e outro católico. Nos afastamos da visão que desqualifica os rumore ... more

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Vilify, ridicule, disinform: Political communication and media trust in the age of generative AI

Christian Schwieter, Milan Gandhi

Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation; Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2024), 23 pp.

"This report examines political communication and media trust in the age of generative artificial intelligence systems (AI). Firstly, it provides a brief explainer of generative AI tools and techniques, looking separately at systems that generate text and those that generate or manipulate images, vi ... more

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“It Was Very Hard for Me to Keep Doing That Job”: Understanding Troll Farm’s Working in the Arab World

Marina Ayeb, Tiziano Bonini

Social Media + Society, volume 10, issue 1 (2024), 10 pp.

"This article investigates the production culture and routines of “troll farms” in three Arab countries—Tunisia, Egypt, and Iraq—from a production studies approach. A production studies approach enables us to focus on the working conditions of paid trolls. We employed qualitative methods to ... more

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Die TikTok-Intifada – Der 7. Oktober & die Folgen im Netz: Analyse & Empfehlungen der Bildungsstätte Anne Frank

Deborah Schnabel, Eva Berendsen

Frankfurt am Main: Bildungsstätte Anne Frank (2024), 38 pp.

"Seit dem Terrorangriff der Hamas auf Israel am 7. Oktober 2023 spielen soziale Netzwerke eine bedeutende und vielfach unterschätzte Rolle bei der Verbreitung von Terrorpropaganda, Falschinformationen, Israelhass, Antisemitismus und Verschwörungsnarrativen. Die Bildungsstätte Anne Frank fasst in ... more

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News Distortion in Times of Crises: Covid-19 Case in the Arab Media

Mostafa Shehata, Noha Adel

International Journal of Communication, volume 18 (2024), pp. 5222-5246

"This article investigates news distortion within the Arab media ecosystem, as manifested on Arab media Facebook pages and perceived by Arab journalists during the COVID-19 pandemic. A textual analysis was conducted on 6 news Facebook pages affiliated with major local media channels in 6 Arab countr ... more

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Unveiling Disinformation: Mapping Attacks on Brazil’s Electoral System and the Response of the Superior Electoral Court (2018–2023)

Regina Cazzamatta, Augusto Santos, Grazielle Albuquerque

International Journal of Communication, volume 18 (2024), pp. 3551-3575

"Falsehoods targeting political parties and candidates have long been entrenched in Brazilian politics and monitored by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). Since the rise of the far right in Brazil, the TSE has itself become a disinformation target. This study aims to unveil disinformation that has ... more

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Russia's Information Warfare in the Middle East

Arik Segal

Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2024), 36 pp.

"This policy paper provides an overview of Russian information warfare in the Middle East. It includes a brief overview of Russian information warfare methods and Russian foreign policy in the Middle East. It then delves into Russian information warfare in the Middle East, evaluates its effectivenes ... more

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Have people ‘had enough of experts’? The impact of populism and pandemic misinformation on institutional trust in comparative perspective

Vaclav Stetka, Francisco Brandao, Sabina Mihelj, Fanni Toth, Daniel Hallin, Danilo Rothberg, Paulo Ferracioli, Beata Klimkiewicz

Information, Communication & Society (2024), 22 pp.

"Public trust in institutions is a key prerequisite for effective crisis management. However, the rise of populism and misinformation in recent years made it increasingly difficult to maintain institutional trust. Despite this recognition, we still lack a systematic understanding of how exposure to ... more

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Digital Disinformation in Africa: Hashtag Politics, Power and Propaganda

Tony Roberts, George Hamandishe Karekwaivanane (ed.)

London: Zed Books (2024), xiv, 242 pp.

"In an era when hashtag campaigns like #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter capture global attention for victims of injustice, politicians and corporations are now spending billions employing Cambridge Analytica-type consultancies to manufacture disinformation - employing trolls, cyborgs and bots to disrupt ... more

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Tackling Disinformation: A Learning Guide

Deutsche Welle DW Akademie (2024)

"Tackling Disinformation: A Learning Guide is aimed at helping those already working in the field, or directly impacted by the issues, such as media professionals, civil society actors, DW Akademie partners and experts. It offers insights for evaluating media development activities and rethinking ap ... more

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Disinformation Strategies

Daniel Arce

Defence and Peace Economics, volume 35, issue 6 (2024), pp. 659–672

"Disinformation is a form of offensive counterintelligence via deception and neutralization in order to strategically manipulate an audience or create further fractures in existing divisions. Disinformation strategies include leaking, lying, seeding, and smearing. These strategies vary according to ... more

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A guide to counter fake news

Abeer Kapoor, Nitika Kakkar, Praveen Kr. Tiwari

New Delhi: Seeking Modern Applications for Real Transformation (SMART) (2024), 77 pp.

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Winning the Battle of Ideas: Exposing Global Authoritarian Narratives and Revitalizing Democratic Principles

Joseph Siegle

Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (2024), 23 pp.

"Rather than selling authoritarianism as such, authoritarian narratives focus on themes that have popular appeal—while attributing a wide range of visceral grievances to the shortcomings of democracy. Authoritarian narratives fall into four broad categories: 1. Noninterference, Choice, and Threats ... to Sovereignty: Narrative attempts to invoke universal themes such as sovereignty, noninterference, and choice which are presented as under threat from the spread of democracy. 2. Exploiting Grievances in the Global South: Tactics designed to attribute the numerous grievances in the Global South to exploitation by the West. 3. Democracies Failing to Deliver: A narrative that takes aim at the efficacy of democracy and, by implication, amplifies the ill-informed narratives about effectiveness of authoritarian governance. 4. Need for a New World Order: Collectively, the claims of Western interference, exploitation, and governance failures are intended to generate disillusionment with democracy and receptiveness to nondemocratic rule. Autocrats use a variety of channels to disseminate these preferred narratives at scale. The four following methods are particularly noteworthy: 1. Social Media: Authoritarians have taken advantage of the enormous—and still growing—social media sphere to promote narratives legitimizing autocracy. They exploit many users’ limited digital literacy skills through information influence campaigns and the employment of bots and online “troll farms” to peddle their preferred worldview. 2. State Broadcasters: Authoritarian actors also disseminate narratives through state media like RT, Sputnik, Xinhua, and China Global Television Network (CGTN). These outlets have the tone and imprimatur of an official news service, giving them a veneer of credibility that expands their reach. 3. Partnerships with Local Media: Authoritarian state-backed outlets aim to embed their content within national information environments. By disseminating preferred narratives through local media outlets and training foreign journalists, authoritarian actors are able to propagate norms of state control over the public information sphere. 4. Foreign Media Cooptation: Finally, authoritarian states are forging partnerships with other state broadcasters. These relationships have the indirect effect of incentivizing self-censorship and enable the intimidation of journalists and activists who criticize authoritarian leadership." (Executive summary, page 1-.2) more

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‘Living in a post-truth era’? Online misinformation in everyday life in rural and urban China

Pu Yan, Ralph Schroeder

Information, Communication & Society (2024), 21 pp.

"This paper investigates everyday information seeking and misinformation among Internet users in rural and urban China. The research employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to identify user demographics and categories of misinformation encountered on mobile devices online. The paper makes ... more

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Disinformation and Peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa: Security Implications of AI-Altered Information Environments

Eduardo Albrecht, Eleonore Fournier-Tombs, Rebecca Brubaker

New York, Geneva: United Nations University (UNU) (2024), 39 pp.

"[...] this report aims to further explore the way in which AI technologies as they currently stand impact peace and conflict, and what methods might be used to mitigate their adverse effects - through the development of better tools and the inclusion of peace and conflict considerations in AI gover ... nance frameworks. The report presents the following findings: 1. AI is a driver of disinformation which adversely impacts peacebuilding efforts. 2. There are several ways to mitigate AI-powered disinformation. 3. AI can also be used to promote peacebuilding, although these mechanisms are still in their early stages. In relation to these findings, the report proposes the following recommendations: 1. More funding and support should be provided to civil society organizations’ efforts to expand media literacy and fact-checking initiatives using AI tools to enhance capabilities. 2. Governments need to work with civil society to develop and implement comprehensive, transparent legal frameworks combating disinformation. These legislative measures need to support digital and media literacy campaigns and fact-checking organizations. 3. Social media companies need to expand investment and research into understanding local information environments, so they can better identify and respond to instances of disinformation in all contexts in which they operate and enhance transparency. 4. Peacebuilding organizations need to carefully consider local media ecosystems and information environments when conducting conflict analyses, and factor these dynamics into their projects’ frameworks. Currently, disinformation exacerbates existing grievances and polarization, can act as a trigger for violence, leads individuals to make decisions based on false information, and creates or intensifies mistrust of institutions and international peacebuilding efforts. The efforts of journalists and civil society organizations to combat these effects, primarily through media literacy initiatives and factchecking, cannot keep up with the scope and scale of ‘fake news.’ Generative AI will increase the rate at which false content is produced and disseminated, and the quality or ‘believability’ of such content. Governments, civil society, and social media companies must work in tandem to combat the spread of disinformation and the impact it can have on peacebuilding efforts and security in sub-Saharan Africa." (Executive summary) more

Mitigating the Risks of Political Microtargeting: Guidance for Policymakers, Civil Society, and Development Cooperation Deep Insights Key Guides

Mitigating the Risks of Political Microtargeting: Guidance for Policymakers, Civil Society, and Development Cooperation
Deep Insights

Key Guides