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Information Manipulation in Sudan: A Baseline Assessment of Actors, Narratives and Tactics

Aida Al-Kaisy, Amal Hamdan

Thomson Foundation (2026), 81 pp.

"The destruction of Sudan’s established information infrastructure at the outset of the conflict in April 2023 has created an environment where systematic information manipulation and disinformation campaigns now flourish unchecked. This has intersected with increasing systematic information manip ... more

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Disinformation: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis
Deep Insights

Lisa Ginsborg, Paula Gori (eds.)

Cham: Springer (2026), xvi, 654 pp.

"This volume provides a multidisciplinary analysis of disinformation and strategies for tackling it. Authored by a diverse group of scholars and experts, chapters in this volume are divided into three thematic sections. The first section delves into disinformation from various disciplinary perspecti ... more

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World Disasters Report 2026: Truth, Trust and Humanitarian Action in the Age of Harmful Information
Deep Insights

Charlotte Lindsey Curtet (ed.)

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC) (2026), 372 pp.

"The World Disasters Report 2026 calls on governments, humanitarian actors, media, technology companies and communities, to recognise that the trustworthiness of information is a matter of life and death. Just as we plan for logistics, shelter and health care in emergencies, we must also plan for th ... e information environment. This requires investing in community engagement, prioritizing listening over speaking, building resilience against harmful narratives and consistently upholding humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in every interaction and message. In 2024, 32 Red Cross and Red Crescent volunteers and staff were killed while on duty; in 2025, a further 27 lives were lost. This is a painful reminder of the risks borne by those who put humanity first, often in the most dangerous circumstances. Their deaths underscore the urgent need to protect humanitarian staff and volunteers, and to safeguard the space they need to save lives. Anything that deepens mistrust, fuels hostility or turns the emblem of protection into a target must be confronted with urgency. Honouring their memory compels us to meet this crisis with urgency and resolve. Hope must also be part of our response. Harmful information thrives on fear and confusion, but hope – rooted in trust, solidarity and human dignity – can be just as contagious. Balancing threats with hope and fostering narratives of agency and possibility offers a vital counterforce. Around the world, communities respond to crises not only with resilience but also with creativity and compassion, often leading the way in finding solutions. By amplifying authentic stories and voices, we do more than counter falsehoods: we inspire action, strengthen trust and remind people that even in the darkest moments, there are paths forward. The IFRC and its member Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies have always worked at the heart of communities, earning trust through presence, transparency and respect. In today’s information crisis, this role matters more than ever. Our commitment is clear and unwavering: act with humanity and based on evidence, uphold trust and put people in need first – so that in moments of fear and uncertainty, the voices that carry furthest are those that heal, aid and protect. Each of us has a role to play. By staying informed, questioning, verifying and amplifying only what is trustworthy and constructive, we strengthen the information environment and ensure that hope speaks louder than harm." (Foreword) more

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Disinformation in Georgia

Koba Turmanidze (ed.)

Caucasus Analytical Digest, issue 145 (2026), 24 pp.

"One highly at-risk cluster is defined by socio-economic and geographic disadvantages. Vulnerability is greater among women, rural residents, and those with lower education and income, according to Bandzeladze and Chkhetiani. The authors further highlight that women living in rural areas with lower ... levels of education and income are collectively most at risk, as assessed by their ability to recognize information correctly. Similarly, Atchaidze and Fabos found that individuals living in rural settlements and those with lower reported income were most likely to receive low scores on the media literacy index, often inaccurately identifying answers as true or false, particularly on themes related to EU integration. A critical finding regarding vulnerability relates to ethnic minorities. The study by Atchaidze and Fabos demonstrated a clear media literacy divide, reporting that ethnic Azerbaijanis and ethnic Armenians scored far lower on the media literacy index compared to ethnic Georgians. These groups’ struggle to accurately assess politically relevant information makes them prime targets for false narratives. Political and ideological factors are also strong predictors of susceptibility. Crucially, politically unaffiliated individuals (nonpartisans or those declining to disclose party affiliation) are the most vulnerable group, reporting the lowest rates of fact-checking and the lowest accuracy in evaluating information, as demonstrated by Bandzeladze and Chkhetiani. Conversely, Bandzeladze and Chkhetiani note that partisan attachment, particularly among opposition supporters, can foster heightened vigilance, leading to greater skepticism and accuracy. Furthermore, subscription to conspiratorial beliefs significantly increases susceptibility to manipulation. Bandzeladze and Chkhetiani found that belief in narratives, such as the state-sponsored “Global War Party,” substantially undermines the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood. The analysis by Chkhetiani delves deeper into the profile of believers in this specific state-driven narrative, noting that men, older citizens (aged 55 and older), the unemployed or self-employed, pro-government TV consumers, and especially supporters of the Georgian Dream party are consistently more receptive to these conspiratorial narratives. This belief system is potent because the state-sponsored Global War Party theory channels diffuse suspicion into a coherent, anti-Western geopolitical attitude. The work of Kobaladze and Gagunashvili explains the mechanism by which such narratives are strategically constructed and disseminated through a “pre-suasion” strategy—framing the West as an enemy and discrediting civil society organizations months in advance—thereby preparing these vulnerable segments of the public to accept controversial legislation, such as the Law on the Transparency of Foreign Influence. These intersecting vulnerabilities—where low objective media literacy meets political disengagement and the acceptance of state-sponsored conspiracy theories—create a fertile environment for manipulation. This collective insight underscores the critical gap between public awareness of disinformation as a threat and the actual media literacy skills necessary to resist it effectively." (Page 2) more

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Threats, Disinformation, and Regulations in the European Digital Environment

Katerina Turková, Veronika Macková (eds.)

New York: Bloomsbury Academic (2026), xii, 252 pp.

"In this edited volume, contributors explore the various threats-both security- and (dis)information-related-that are present within the European digital environment, along with the subsequent regulations imposed across the region in response to these threats. Due to the fluctuating evolution of EU- ... more

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Disarming Disinformation: Brazil
Deep Insights

Julie Posetti, Nabeelah Shabbir, Kaylee Williams (eds.)

International Center for Journalists (ICFJ); University of London, City St George's (2025), 35 pp.

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Destruktive Diskurse: Digitale Verbreitung von klimabezogener Mis- und Desinformation

Hanna Börgmann, Dominik Hammer, Jan Beyer, Jonas Ziock, Fiete Stegers, Philipp Keßling, Felix Münch

Berlin; Hamburg: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD); Hans-Bredow-Institut (2025), 52 pp.

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Russian information operations outside of the Western information environment

Jonathan Morley-Davies, Jem Thomas, Graham Baines

Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Rev. version (2025), 184 pp.

"This report, drawing from research, qualitative and quantitative data, Key Insight Interviews (KIIs), digital tools, and Russian information and deception doctrine, explores the Kremlin’s IIOs in non-Western environments using five selected countries as case studies: Egypt, Mali, Kenya, South Afr ... more

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Determinants of fake news diffusion on social media: A systematic literature review

Khurram Shahzad, Shakeel Ahmad Khan, Abid Iqbal, Omar Shabbir, Mujahid Latif

Global Knowledge, Memory and Communication (GKMC), volume 74, issue 7-8 (2025), pp. 2069-2092

"This paper aims to explore the determinants causing fake information proliferation on social media platforms and the challenges to control the diffusion of fake news phenomena. The authors applied the systematic review methodology to conduct a synthetic analysis of 37 articles published in peer-rev ... more

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AI-Generated Disinformation in Europe and Africa: Use Cases, Solutions and Transnational Learning

Karen Allen, Christopher Nehring

Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Media Programme Sub-Sahara Africa (2025), xii, 158 pp.

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Donetsk Don’t Tell: ‘Hybrid War’ in Ukraine and the Limits of Social Media Influence Operations

Lennart Maschmeyer, Alexei Abrahams, Peter Pomerantsev, Volodymyr Yermolenko

Journal of Information Technology & Politics, volume 22, issue 1 (2025), pp. 49-64

"Many fear that social media enable more potent influence operations than traditional mass media. This belief is widely shared yet rarely tested. We challenge this emerging wisdom by comparing social media and television as vectors for influence operations targeting Ukraine. This article develops a ... more

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Psychological Defence and Information Influence: A Textbook on Theory and Practice

Jesper Falkheimer, James Pamment (eds.)

Karlstad: Psychological Defence Agency (2025), 257 pp.

"In an age defined by rapid information flows and shifting security landscapes, the resilience of societies rests not only on military strength or technological capacity, but equally on the ability of individuals and institutions to withstand psychological influence and manipulation. Psychological d ... more

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Recommendations for strengthening Mauritania´s resilience against disinformation. White paper

Bonn: Deutsche Welle DW Akademie (2025), 18 pp.

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Digital occupation: Pro-Russian bot networks target Ukraine’s occupied territories on Telegram

Yuliia Dukach, Iryna Adam, Meredith Furbish

Atlantic Council, July 16 (2025)

"This joint report from OpenMinds and the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) analyzes the activity of a network of 3,634 automated accounts that posted pro-Russian comments on Telegram channels between January 2024 and April 2025 targeting Ukrainian populations inside Russian-occupied territorie ... more

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Fact-Checking Organisations in the Balkans after US Funding Cuts

Manuela Anastasova

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Media Programme South East Europe (2025), 6 pp.

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Disarming disinformation in the media: What works, what doesn't and why

Cambridge: Thomson Foundation (2025), 4 pp.

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Information Ecosystems and Troubled Democracy: A Global Synthesis of the State of Knowledge on New Media, AI and Data Governance
Deep Insights

Robin Mansell, Flavia Durach, Matthias C Kettemann, Théophile Lenoir, Rob Procter, Gyan Tripathi, Emily Tucker

Paris: International Observatory on Information and Democracy (2025), xxxvi, 265 pp.

"This report is an invitation to grapple with the complex interplay between infrastructure, media systems, civil society, and public sector institutions. Our findings suggest that effective policy solutions must: acknowledge the historical, political, economic, and social forces that shape informati ... more

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Emerging Media Structures, Media Policy and the Challenge of Disinformation in Post-Assad Syria

Asiem El Difraoui, Carola Richter, Anja Wollenberg

Berlin: Media in Cooperation and Transition (MiCT) (2025), 54 pp.

"This study analyses the media ecosystem in post-Assad Syria, focusing on the proliferation of disinformation, ethno-sectarian hate speech and Foreign Interference (FIMI). It covers the period from December 2024 to December 2025, one year after the collapse of the Assad regime. Besides disinformati ... on, the research examines emerging media structures, media policies of the transitional government, and the professional conditions of journalists across different regions of Syria. The study is based on field research conducted in Damascus in September and November 2025, semi-structured interviews with approximately 60 stakeholders —including government officials, journalists, and media experts from eight Syrian cities— in-depth desk research, social media analysis and a focus group discussion with Syrian media professionals held during a workshop in Amman [...] Within this broader context, the Syrian media landscape is undergoing significant transformation. State media institutions, such as the television channel Al-Ikhbariya, the news agency SANA, and the newspaper Al-Thawra, have adjusted their editorial lines and now largely support the new government, with limited critical coverage. The state media sector employs an estimated 7,000–8,000 staff, but displays pronounced salary inequalities between long-standing employees and newly appointed executives from Idlib. Media outlets funded by Qatar, including Syria Now and Syria TV, have gained prominence due to their close alignment with the new authorities. While some exile media outlets have begun to return to Syria, local and independent media organisations continue to operate under precarious financial conditions. In the Kurdish-controlled northeast of Syria (AANES), an autonomous media system persists, though it has been severely affected by the withdrawal of U.S. funding. Disinformation represents a central challenge in the Syrian media and information environment, particularly given the dominance of social media and messaging platforms as primary news sources. The study identifies multiple actors involved in coordinated disinformation campaigns. These include remnants of the former regime (Foloul), who seek to destabilise the transitional authorities as well as foreign actors—for example Russia, Iran, Israel and Turkey—that pursue their own geopolitical interests partly through coordinated campaigns; and ISIS propaganda, which routinely calls for attacks on Alawites, Shias, Christians, Druze, Kurds, and other groups it casts as enemies. Most of the various ethno-religious communities are both targets and producers of disinformation. Competing narratives centred on victimhood, revenge, and revisionism have contributed to cycles of mistrust and fear. Disinformation, hate speech, and propaganda are primarily disseminated via Facebook, WhatsApp, and Telegram. Based on these findings, the study proposes five policy recommendations: (1) the establishment of a Syria Media and Disinformation Observatory to monitor and analyse disinformation trends; (2) the development of a context-sensitive media literacy toolkit; (3) sustained international funding for public interest media; (4) cross-regional professional networking and training programmes for Syrian journalists; and (5) youth-focused initiatives aimed at promoting social cohesion. The study concludes that the future development of a pluralistic media system in Syria will depend largely on internal power dynamics within the ruling elites, particularly the balance between ideological hardliners and more pragmatic actors." (Executive summary) more

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Why do people spread fake news? Modelling the factors that influence social media users’ fake news sharing behaviour

Yan An, Yinan Huang, Ndonima Uhwe Danjuma, Oberiri Destiny Apuke, Elif Asude Tunca

Information Development, volume 41, issue 1 (2025), pp. 48-60

"This study modelled the factors that influence fake news spreading behaviour among social media users. To gather our data, we used an online survey to sample 385 social media users in Nigeria, using a chain referral approach. Smart PLS structural equation modelling was used to analyse the data (SEM ... more

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Global Communication and Propaganda

Richard C. Vincent

In: Global Communication: A Multicultural Perspective

Yahya R. Kamalipour (ed.)

Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield (2025), pp. 153-198

"Propaganda involves the persuasive communication process to influence and convert individuals and the public at large, directly or implicitly, through the use of purposively chosen and partial, or even fabricated, disinformation [...] Regarding the understanding of propaganda, the first mistake is ... more

Disinformation: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis Deep Insights

World Disasters Report 2026: Truth, Trust and Humanitarian Action in the Age of Harmful Information Deep Insights

Disarming Disinformation: Brazil Deep Insights

Information Ecosystems and Troubled Democracy: A Global Synthesis of the State of Knowledge on New Media, AI and Data Governance Deep Insights

Disinformation: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis
Deep Insights

World Disasters Report 2026: Truth, Trust and Humanitarian Action in the Age of Harmful Information
Deep Insights

Disarming Disinformation: Brazil
Deep Insights

Information Ecosystems and Troubled Democracy: A Global Synthesis of the State of Knowledge on New Media, AI and Data Governance
Deep Insights