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Nachrichten, Fake News und Wahlen

Uli Gleich

Media Perspektiven, issue 5 (2025), 10 pp.

"Voraussetzung dafür, dass (politische) Fake News Wirkung entfalten, sind gewisse Vulnerabilitätsfaktoren auf Seiten der Userinnen und User. Laut den Studien von Daunt und anderen (2023) sowie von Gupta und anderen (2023) gehören dazu zum Beispiel der Glaube an Verschwörungserzählungen, Patriot ... ismus, Konservatismus und die Tendenz zu kollektivistischen Ideen von Gesellschaft. Die Analysen von Schnaudt (2024) zeigen, dass Verschwörungserzählungen nicht nur in den USA, sondern auch in den europäischen Ländern eine Herausforderung für demokratische Prozesse (z. B. Wahlen) darstellen, wenn Menschen die falschen Informationen für glaubwürdig halten. Auch Mauk und Grömping (2024) fanden in ihrer Studie heraus, dass Autoritarismus und Verschwörungsmentalität, also die Neigung, sich die Welt über Verschwörungstheorien zu erklären, das Vertrauen in Wahlen mindern, weil Informationen motiviert, das heißt in Richtung einer bestehenden Voreinstellung, verarbeitet werden. Fake News können diese motivierte Verarbeitung unterstützen und damit einen destabilisierenden Effekt erzeugen. Laut Stachofsky, Schaupp und Crossler (2023) besteht gerade bei Wählergruppen, die ihre Informationen aus Quellen beziehen, die häufig (politische) Fake News verbreiten, eine besondere Anfälligkeit, die Integrität von Wahlen in Zweifel zu ziehen. Besonders interessant ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Erkenntnis, dass die Herausforderung durch Falschinformationen und Verschwörungserzählungen ironischerweise gerade in denjenigen Ländern hoch ausgeprägt ist, in denen die Rahmenbedingungen für demokratische und unbeeinflusste Wahlen objektiv am günstigsten sind (vgl. auch die Studie von Vliegenthart und anderen, 2024). Und selbst wenn keine tatsächlichen Erkenntnisse über Anomalien bei der Durchführung von Wahlen vorliegen, können Informationen über die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Unregelmäßigkeiten die oben erwähnte motivierte Informationsverarbeitung in Gang setzten und das Vertrauen in die Integrität von Wahlen bedrohen (vgl. die Studie von Kuk, Lee und Rhee (2024)). Studien, die den direkten Einfluss von Fake News auf Wahlentscheidungen untersuchen, sind methodisch schwierig und selten zu finden. Iida und andere (2024) konnten nur geringe Effekte feststellen und betonen, dass eine entsprechende Wirkung eher bei Personen entsteht, die keine ausgeprägten politischen Überzeugungen haben und/oder politisch weniger gut informiert sind. Auch Cantarella, Fraccaroli und Volpe (2023) konnten nur kleine Effekte ermitteln, die jedoch signifikant zum Wahlergebnis zugunsten populistischer Parteien in Italien beigetragen haben." (Zusammenfassung, Seiten 1-2) more

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Why do people spread fake news? Modelling the factors that influence social media users’ fake news sharing behaviour

Yan An, Yinan Huang, Ndonima Uhwe Danjuma, Oberiri Destiny Apuke, Elif Asude Tunca

Information Development, volume 41, issue 1 (2025), pp. 48-60

"This study modelled the factors that influence fake news spreading behaviour among social media users. To gather our data, we used an online survey to sample 385 social media users in Nigeria, using a chain referral approach. Smart PLS structural equation modelling was used to analyse the data (SEM ... more

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Don’t Talk to Strangers? The Role of Network Composition, WhatsApp Groups, and Partisanship in Explaining Beliefs in Misinformation About COVID-19 in Brazil

Patricia Rossini, Antonis Kalogeropoulos

Journal of Information Technology & Politics, volume 22, issue 1 (2025), pp. 113-130

"The spread of disinformation has been a topic of heightened concern, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, as the response to a public health crisis relies on the ability for public officials to inform citizens. Using a representative two-wave panel of internet users in Brazil, we examine the ... more

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Fact-Checking Organisations in the Balkans after US Funding Cuts

Manuela Anastasova

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Media Programme South East Europe (2025), 6 pp.

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Destruktive Diskurse: Digitale Verbreitung von klimabezogener Mis- und Desinformation

Hanna Börgmann, Dominik Hammer, Jan Beyer, Jonas Ziock, Fiete Stegers, Philipp Keßling, Felix Münch

Berlin; Hamburg: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD); Hans-Bredow-Institut (2025), 52 pp.

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Climate Disinformation in Thailand: Negating Indigenous Peoples’ Identity

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2025), viii, 60 pp.

"This report examines how climate disinformation reinforces the systemic negation of Indigenous People's (IP) identity, undermining traditional practices, weakening advocacy for rights and obstructing inclusive climate and forest governance by making three key contributions. First, it identifies fou ... r distinct forms of climate disinformation in Thailand: one-sided reporting, where the media spotlights government and corporate initiatives while omitting their social and environmental harms, whether due to political pressure or economic incentives; greenwashing, where corporations exaggerate or misrepresent their sustainability practices to obscure their ongoing environmentally destructive activities; false climate solutions promoted as climate action which fails to address the root causes of climate change while leaving IP communities socially and economically disadvantaged; scapegoating of IPs where Indigenous communities are falsely portrayed as primary drivers of deforestation, legitimising displacement and marginalisation. Second, it demonstrates four ways in which climate disinformation harms IPs, each reinforcing the negation of their identities: exclusion from decision-making: by either barring their participation outright or dismissing their inputs in decision-making processes, IPs’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is removed thereby negating their identities as owners and stewards of their land; criminalisation: the strategic misuse of “climate change” laws to negate IP identity and erase the legitimacy of IPs’ traditions and practices in environmental stewardship; and the use of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) intimidate advocates for challenging climate disinformation; forced evictions: conservation and development narratives justify deterritorialisation that severs spiritual, cultural and economic ties to ancestral lands which forms the core of IPs’ identities; intimidation and violence: harassment, threats and attacks undermining the capacity of IPs to resist projects and actions that harm them, their environment and their way of life. Third, to address climate disinformation and safeguard Indigenous Peoples’ (IPs) rights and identities in Thailand, this report outlines a list of multi-stakeholder recommendations: UN bodies should integrate climate disinformation into their human rights monitoring and climate action frameworks and provide guidance to Thailand on implementing its international obligations; the Thai government should embed safeguards against climate disinformation into national climate and environmental policies, strengthen legal protections for IPs, ensure meaningful participation of IP communities in decision-making and improve transparency and accountability in environmental governance; international NGOs (INGOs) should collaborate with IP organisations to map, document and respond to climate disinformation, provide sustained technical capacity-building and funding, and support advocacy and litigation to defend IP rights; civil society organisations (CSOs) should monitor disinformation targeting IPs, co-develop counter-narratives with IP communities and educational content to empower both IPs and the broader public and expand legal aid support; the media sector should prioritise constructive and investigative journalism on climate, environmental, and IP issues; expand coverage in Indigenous languages and culturally appropriate formats; collaborate with IP organisations on fact-checking and monitoring disinformation; and amplify Indigenous perspectives through both national and international outlets; technology companies should strengthen content moderation against climate disinformation, flag misleading project information and invest in digital literacy and connectivity initiatives for rural and Indigenous communities; indigenous communities and organisations should build monitoring networks to identify and counter disinformation, strengthen alliances with independent and Indigenous media, conduct and participate in capacity-building workshops and use digital tools to amplify their voices and safeguard knowledge." (Executive summary, pages vi-vii) more

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Governing Misinformation in Everyday Knowledge Commons

Madelyn Sanfilippo, Melissa G. Ocepek (eds.)

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2025), xiv, 278 pp.

"Governing Misinformation in Everyday Knowledge Commons delves into the complex issue of misinformation in our daily lives. The book synthesizes three scholarly traditions - everyday life, misinformation, and governing knowledge commons - to present 10 case studies of online and offline communities ... more

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What makes audiences resilient to disinformation? Integrating micro, meso, and macro factors based on a systematic literature review

Jülide Kont, Wim Elving, Marcel Broersma, Çiðdem Bozdað

Communications, volume 50, issue 2 (2025), pp. 534-555

"Despite increased attention since 2015, there is little consensus on why audiences believe or share disinformation. In our study, we propose a shift in analytical perspective by applying the concept of resilience. Through a systematic literature review (n = 95), we identify factors that have been ... more

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Empowering Youth to Combat Malicious Deepfakes and Disinformation: An Experiential and Reflective Learning Experience Informed by Personal Construct Theory

Nadia Naffi, Mélodie Charest, Sarah Danis et al.

Journal of Constructivist Psychology, volume 38, issue 1 (2025), 22 pp.

"The potential to weaponize deepfakes is growing at an alarming rate. The study aimed to explore how education can help youth develop resilience to malicious deepfakes and the ability to counter disinformation, regardless of context. Sixteen youth between the ages of 18 and 24 participated in a 9-h, ... more

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Psychological Defence and Information Influence: A Textbook on Theory and Practice

Jesper Falkheimer, James Pamment (eds.)

Karlstad: Psychological Defence Agency (2025), 257 pp.

"In an age defined by rapid information flows and shifting security landscapes, the resilience of societies rests not only on military strength or technological capacity, but equally on the ability of individuals and institutions to withstand psychological influence and manipulation. Psychological d ... more

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Media and Propaganda in an Age of Disinformation

Nelson Ribeiro, Barbie Zelizer (eds.)

New York; London: Routledge (2025), viii, 205 pp.

"First, the book looks at media and propaganda through the lens of different disciplines, ranging across communication and media studies, journalism studies, psychology, neuroscience, sociology, history, gender studies, information and library science, literature, and platform studies. Recognizing t ... more

Encrypted Messaging and Extreme Speech: Policy Directions

Anmol Alphonso, Sérgio Barbosa, Cayley Clifford, Kiran Garimella, Elonnai Hickok, Martin Riedl, Erkan Saka, Herman Wasserman, Sahana Udupa

Munich: Ludwig-Maximilian Universität (LMU); Center for Digital Dignity (2025), 58 pp.

"The report highlights interventions in six main categories, namely: Platform governance; Mitigating digital influence operations; Supporting research; Strengthening fact-checking; Awareness raising and capacity building; Leveraging artificial intelligence responsibly. The recommendations highlight ... more

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Tackling Disinformation, Information Manipulation and Interference in Four African Elections
Deep Insights

Dani Madrid-Morales, Herman Wasserman, Nicola Davies-Laubscher, Fatoumata Sow

Mapping Electoral Disinformation inAfrica (MEDiA); Centre for Information Integrity in Africa (CIIA); Stellenbosch University (2025), 58 pp.

"In recent years, electoral disinformation has followed several recurring patterns globally, many of which were observed in the case studies analysed in this report. One prominent tactic is attacks on electoral integrity, where political actors spread false claims about voter registration, election ... rigging, or external interference to delegitimise outcomes. As we show in this report, in the DRC, for example, rumours circulated that biometric voter registration was designed to expose individuals’ HIV status, discouraging participation. In South Africa, disinformation networks falsely claimed that the Electoral Commission (IEC) was manipulating results to favour the ruling party, fueling distrust in the electoral process. Another trend is the weaponisation of ethnic and gendered disinformation. In Kenya, misleading narratives framed certain candidates as “foreign-sponsored outsiders” to undermine their legitimacy, while in Senegal, false claims about morality were used to discredit opposition figures. Meanwhile, gendered disinformation—targeting women candidates with sexist tropes and false accusations—was a recurring feature in all four countries, reflecting a broader global pattern in which women in politics are disproportionately subjected to online abuse and misinformation. Social media platforms have been central to the spread of electoral disinformation. Across Africa, as in much of the world, platforms such as Facebook, TikTok, and X (formerly Twitter) have served as primary vehicles for the rapid dissemination of falsehoods, often facilitated by coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Data that we present in the report shows that, in South Africa, paid “nano-influencers”—individuals with small but loyal online followings—were mobilised to amplify misleading narratives in favour of specific political actors, demonstrating how disinformation strategies are evolving in response to changing digital landscapes. [...] In response to these findings, the report makes several key recommendations. First, it calls for greater cross-platform coordination among CSOs, fact-checking groups, and election monitors to ensure realtime responses to emerging disinformation threats. Second, it highlights the importance of media and digital literacy programmes among all age groups, including young voters, some of whom are often the most active on social media but may lack the skills to critically assess the credibility of information they encounter. Third, it urges greater transparency and accountability from technology platforms, which remain the primary distribution channels for electoral disinformation but have done little to curb its spread in African electoral contexts. Ultimately, electoral disinformation is not simply a digital challenge—it is a fundamental governance issue that shapes public perceptions of legitimacy and democratic participation. Evidence from the four elections in Africa that we examine in this report demonstrates that countering disinformation requires a multi-stakeholder approach that includes journalists, civil society actors, election commissions, and policymakers working collaboratively to strengthen information integrity and electoral transparency. The findings in this report offer both a diagnosis of the current disinformation landscape and a framework for more effective, evidence-based responses that can help safeguard future elections from manipulation." (Pages 9-10) more

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Emerging Media Structures, Media Policy and the Challenge of Disinformation in Post-Assad Syria

Asiem El Difraoui, Carola Richter, Anja Wollenberg

Berlin: Media in Cooperation and Transition (MiCT) (2025), 54 pp.

"This study analyses the media ecosystem in post-Assad Syria, focusing on the proliferation of disinformation, ethno-sectarian hate speech and Foreign Interference (FIMI). It covers the period from December 2024 to December 2025, one year after the collapse of the Assad regime. Besides disinformati ... on, the research examines emerging media structures, media policies of the transitional government, and the professional conditions of journalists across different regions of Syria. The study is based on field research conducted in Damascus in September and November 2025, semi-structured interviews with approximately 60 stakeholders —including government officials, journalists, and media experts from eight Syrian cities— in-depth desk research, social media analysis and a focus group discussion with Syrian media professionals held during a workshop in Amman [...] Within this broader context, the Syrian media landscape is undergoing significant transformation. State media institutions, such as the television channel Al-Ikhbariya, the news agency SANA, and the newspaper Al-Thawra, have adjusted their editorial lines and now largely support the new government, with limited critical coverage. The state media sector employs an estimated 7,000–8,000 staff, but displays pronounced salary inequalities between long-standing employees and newly appointed executives from Idlib. Media outlets funded by Qatar, including Syria Now and Syria TV, have gained prominence due to their close alignment with the new authorities. While some exile media outlets have begun to return to Syria, local and independent media organisations continue to operate under precarious financial conditions. In the Kurdish-controlled northeast of Syria (AANES), an autonomous media system persists, though it has been severely affected by the withdrawal of U.S. funding. Disinformation represents a central challenge in the Syrian media and information environment, particularly given the dominance of social media and messaging platforms as primary news sources. The study identifies multiple actors involved in coordinated disinformation campaigns. These include remnants of the former regime (Foloul), who seek to destabilise the transitional authorities as well as foreign actors—for example Russia, Iran, Israel and Turkey—that pursue their own geopolitical interests partly through coordinated campaigns; and ISIS propaganda, which routinely calls for attacks on Alawites, Shias, Christians, Druze, Kurds, and other groups it casts as enemies. Most of the various ethno-religious communities are both targets and producers of disinformation. Competing narratives centred on victimhood, revenge, and revisionism have contributed to cycles of mistrust and fear. Disinformation, hate speech, and propaganda are primarily disseminated via Facebook, WhatsApp, and Telegram. Based on these findings, the study proposes five policy recommendations: (1) the establishment of a Syria Media and Disinformation Observatory to monitor and analyse disinformation trends; (2) the development of a context-sensitive media literacy toolkit; (3) sustained international funding for public interest media; (4) cross-regional professional networking and training programmes for Syrian journalists; and (5) youth-focused initiatives aimed at promoting social cohesion. The study concludes that the future development of a pluralistic media system in Syria will depend largely on internal power dynamics within the ruling elites, particularly the balance between ideological hardliners and more pragmatic actors." (Executive summary) more

Climate Disinformation in Pakistan: Silencing Indigenous Peoples’ Voice

Humera Qasim Khan, Waqas Naeem

Islamabad: International Media Support (IMS); Institute for Research, Advocacy and Development (IRADA); Mediastan (2025), vii, 39 pp.

"The study identifies five distinct forms of climate disinformation in Pakistan: alarmist and sensationalised content, which exaggerates climate impact to provoke fear, confusion and emotional reactions rather than informed understanding; conspiracy-driven narratives that suggest hidden agendas or e ... xternal actors manipulating climate event, undermining trust in institutions and science; denial and delay narratives where scientific consensus is rejected or inaction is promoted by downplaying risks and questioning the urgency of climate response; oversimplified or false solutions that promote misleading or ineffective fixes to distract from evidence-based mitigation and adaptation strategies; religious fatalism, which frames climate change effects as predetermined or divinely inevitable, reducing perceived human responsibility and discouraging action.hich frames climate change effects as predetermined or divinely inevitable, reducing perceived human responsibility and discouraging action. The study also confirms findings from literature about structural weaknesses within Pakistan’s news media environment, which include a lack of consistent news coverage of climate issues, limited scientific literacy among journalists, editorial incentives favouring sensationalism over accuracy and the absence of systematic fact-checking protocols. These gaps, exacerbated by platform algorithms that reward virality over veracity, create a situation where climate-related disinformation may spread unchecked. The report shows that the climate disinformation impacts IPs in five ways: first, it affects community safety and Indigenous livelihoods by creating a false sense of security or conversely unnecessary panic among IP communities that may lead to damage, displacement and poor adaptation and mitigation practices; second, disinformation related to natural disasters generates fear, uncertainty, confusion and psychological distress among vulnerable IP communities, creating emotional trauma and diminishing their self-confidence in their ability to respond to climate risks; third, climate-related disinformation erodes trust of IPs in scientific forecasts, institutional information and the official responses of state authorities, as viral disinformation messages and rumours fill the information vacuum created by the absence of clear, timely and accessible climate communication; fourth, it discourages Indigenous ecological knowledge and diminishes the credibility of local adaptation methods by painting these methods as primitive, unscientific or outdated; fifth, climate disinformation intensifies the existing exclusion, marginalisation and invisibility of IPs in climate policy frameworks and climate governance mechanisms, silencing their voices and forcibly transforming them from custodians of community resilience to subjects of pity or blame within the policy and media discourses. The study underscores that climate disinformation is not an isolated digital problem but a systemic governance challenge. It undermines trust in science and institutions, weakens public engagement and delays adaptation efforts. This crisis of information integrity demands coordinated action across sectors. The report offers the following recommendations for key stakeholders to address climate disinformation and its impact on Indigenous peoples and communities in Pakistan. UN bodies should support the government in integrating climate information integrity in national climate and digital governance frameworks and ensure Pakistan’s compliance with relevant international conventions and declarations on the rights of Indigenous Peoples. The relevant ministries of the federal and provincial governments should embed information integrity into Pakistan’s climate governance frameworks, including the National Action Plan and Nationally Determined Contributions, to ensure coordinated and accountable action on climate misinformation. iNGOs should facilitate the creation of a National Climate Fact-Checking Alliance linking journalists, researchers, media organisations and civil society for real-time verification and rapid debunking of false climate narratives. CSOs should establish community-based verification networks, conduct grassroots awareness campaigns, promote digital safety and information verification capacity building for IPs and document and amplify local climate knowledge. Media should set up climate news beats within newsrooms, ensure the presence of trained journalists for environmental reporting, institutionalise fact-checking protocols, provide training for journalists on climate science and disaster reporting and adopt ethical editorial standards for coverage of climate emergencies. Technology companies should implement algorithmic accountability measures to curb the viral spread of climate disinformation, promote verified climate information through priority ranking and contextual labels, collaborate with fact-checkers to monitor regional-language climate content for falsehoods and support rapid-response climate information alerts for Pakistan during climate-induced extreme weather events. Indigenous communities should engage in peer-led digital literacy programmes that build capacity to recognise and counter climate disinformation and collaborate with independent media to document." (Executive summary, pages vi-vii) more

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Currents of Truth: A Journalist's Quest for Justice in the Age of AI

Ryan Pedro

Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Media Programme Sub-Sahara Africa (2025), 51 pp.

"This is a story set in a fictional city in Africa, in the not-too-far future. It follows a young investigative journalist, her mentor and her friend, a computer genius, who work together to uncover and expose a complex disinformation campaign fuelled by artificial intelligence and save their people ... more

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Charitable Instruction: Towards a Catholic-Thomistic Response to Misinformation

Wesley Kim D. Soguilon

Religion and Social Communication, volume 23, issue 2 (2025), pp. 474-496

"One of the problems the Philippines faces is the plague of misinformation, and this paper provides the groundwork for a possible Catholic-Thomistic response. In this work, the researcher attempts to answer the question of why Catholics need to solve this problem and what they can do to solve it. Th ... more

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Desinformación, periodismo y democracia

Omar Rincon, Esther Borges

La Paz: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (2025), 31 pp.

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Information Ecosystems and Troubled Democracy: A Global Synthesis of the State of Knowledge on New Media, AI and Data Governance
Deep Insights

Robin Mansell, Flavia Durach, Matthias C Kettemann, Théophile Lenoir, Rob Procter, Gyan Tripathi, Emily Tucker

Paris: International Observatory on Information and Democracy (2025), xxxvi, 265 pp.

"This report is an invitation to grapple with the complex interplay between infrastructure, media systems, civil society, and public sector institutions. Our findings suggest that effective policy solutions must: acknowledge the historical, political, economic, and social forces that shape informati ... more

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State-Sponsored Disinformation Around the Globe: How Politicians Deceive their Citizens

Martin Echeverría Victoria, Sara Garcia Santamaria, Daniel C. Hallin (eds.)

Oxford: Routledge (2025), xiii, 336 pp.

"This book explores the pervasive and globalised trajectory of domestic disinformation. It describes specific operations and general apparatuses of disinformation that are sponsored by the State institutions in several countries around the world, such as governments, political parties, and politicia ... more

Tackling Disinformation, Information Manipulation and Interference in Four African Elections Deep Insights

Information Ecosystems and Troubled Democracy: A Global Synthesis of the State of Knowledge on New Media, AI and Data Governance Deep Insights

Tackling Disinformation, Information Manipulation and Interference in Four African Elections
Deep Insights

Information Ecosystems and Troubled Democracy: A Global Synthesis of the State of Knowledge on New Media, AI and Data Governance
Deep Insights