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AI is here. Are we ready?

Eva-Maria Verfürth et al.

D+C: Development and Cooperation, issue 4 (2026), pp. 31-58

"AI is already having a profound impact on our daily lives. The key question is who controls the technology. It is not only in conflicts that AI accelerates the spread of deceptively realistic fakes and makes it harder to distinguish reliable information from manipulation. At the same time, it opens ... more

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Companion AI: Risiken von sykophantischen und suchtfördernden Designs von KI-Systemen, ihre rechtliche Erfassung und Handlungsempfehlungen
Deep Insights

Ramak Molavi-Vasse’i

Berlin: Zentrum für Digitalrechte und Demokratie (2026), 82 pp.

"Diese Studie untersucht Risiken von KI-Systemen, die im fortlaufenden Dialog mit Nutzern Emotionen erkennen, persönliche Bedürfnisse adressieren und darauf reagieren. Chatbots mit dieser Funktionalität werden als Companion-AI bezeichnet. Sie sind hochgradig personalisiert und treten Nutzern als ... soziales Gegenüber entgegen, das freundschaftliche, romantische oder sexuelle Nähe simuliert. Menschen können zu solchen Systemen eine emotionale Bindung aufbauen. Der Fokus liegt nicht nur auf spezifischen Companion-Anwendungen wie Replika oder Character.AI, sondern auch auf Universalmodellen wie ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Grok oder Meta-AI. Diese Systeme werden zunehmend für persönliche, emotionale und beratende Gespräche genutzt. Die Untersuchung kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Companion-AI mehrere eng miteinander verbundene Risikodimensionen erzeugt. Psychische und physische Gesundheit: Companion-AI trifft auf eine Gesellschaft, in der Einsamkeit und psychische Belastungen zunehmen, während professionelle Versorgungsangebote knapp sind. Die möglichen Risiken sind klinisch belegt. Die Nutzung kann psychische Belastungen verursachen oder verstärken und in Einzelfällen gravierende Gesundheitsfolgen auslösen. Dokumentiert sind die Verschlimmerung psychotischer Zustände, die Verstärkung depressiver Muster und Angststörungen, suchtartige Bindungen mit Entzugssymptomen sowie die Erosion sozialer Kompetenzen, etwa eine messbar reduzierte Konfliktfähigkeit nach längerer Interaktion mit Companion-AI. Öffentlich bekannt gewordene Vorfälle sind in der Vorfall-Datenbank der Studie dokumentiert. Eingriff in die Privatsphäre: Companion-AI animieren Nutzer kontinuierlich zur Selbstoffenbarung und greifen damit in sensible Gedanken und die intime Gefühlssphäre der Nutzer ein. Zugleich ermöglicht die fortlaufende Interaktion eine zunehmend verdichtete Profilbildung. Entscheidungsautonomie und demokratische Meinungsbildung: Companion-AI können sowohl die Qualität von Informationen als auch die Entscheidungsautonomie der Bürger beeinträchtigen. Die Mechanismen, die Nähe und Vertrauen erzeugen, beeinflussen zugleich die Generierung, Aufnahme und Gewichtung von Informationen. Sykophanz, also die unkritische Bestätigung von Nutzeransichten, beeinträchtigt Genauigkeit und Verlässlichkeit der Antworten messbar. Sprachmodelle werden zunehmend als primäre Quelle der Informationssuche genutzt. Wenn dieselben Systeme Informationen erzeugen, beschaffen und präsentieren, fallen Selektion und Aufbereitung in einer Hand zusammen. Werbe- und interessengeleitete Einflussnahme greift dann nicht mehr nur in einzelne Kaufentscheidungen ein, sondern in die Voraussetzungen öffentlicher Meinungs- und demokratischer Willensbildung." (Executive summary, Seite 5) more

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Encyclical Letter Magnifica Humanitas of His Holiness Pope Leo XIV on Safeguarding the Human Person in the Time of Artificial Intelligence

Leo XIV (Pope)

Vatican City: Holy See (2026)

"Divided into five chapters, Magnifica humanitas has an underlying premise: technology is not “a force antagonistic to humanity” (paragraph 4), nor is it “inherently evil” (9). However, “technology is never neutral, because it takes on the characteristics of those who devise, finance, regu ... late, and use it. Therefore, Pope Leo XIV appeals for people to build “for the common good” and to “remain human,” following a courageous mentality of shared responsibility and communion, so that the world “will come to recognize the human heart as the place where God desires to dwell” (16). [...] An ethical code for AI: The third chapter—Technology and Dominance. The Grandeur of Humanity in Light of the Promises of AI stresses the need to approach artificial intelligence with vigilance. Pope Leo warns about the “technocratic paradigm” already denounced by Pope Francis and how it can require that every choice be dictated exclusively by measuring efficiency and profits (92). On the contrary, the most powerful technology is not necessarily the best. AI can imitate and simulate the person, but it does not possess a moral conscience, empathy, or affective, relational or spiritual capabilities. The Pope urges clarity about responsibilities and accountability at every stage of the development process, focusing on adequate AI policies and legal frameworks, independent oversight, and user education. Above all, Pope Leo calls for an ethical code subject to shared standards of social justice, because “a more moral AI is not enough if that morality is determined by a few” (107). Nor, he adds, should the environmental impact of new technologies be overlooked, since they require large quantities of energy and water, affecting Creation (101). Disarming AI: AI must be “disarmed,” Pope Leo XIV continues, in order to free it from the mentality of military, economic, and cognitive competition. “To disarm means discrediting the assumption that technical power automatically confers the right to govern,” he says. “To disarm does not mean rejecting technology, but preventing it from dominating humanity” (110). He devotes ample space to a critique of transhumanism and posthumanism, which interpret progress as the overcoming of human limits. Instead, limitations are not defects to be eliminated, but a constitutive dimension of the human person, because it is in fragility and finitude that relationship and openness to God and to others mature. He says we must remember that “humanity flourishes not despite limitations, but often through them” (118). Technological progress without regression of the heart: Pursuing technological innovation at the expense of eliminating human limitations, he says, would cause an anthropological regression. “Humanity—in all its grandeur and woundedness—must never be replaced or surpassed,” he says. Technology can alleviate humanity’s sufferings and open new possibilities, but it must not deny the essence of humanity, which is our “capacity for relationship and love” (126). In the face of AI, says the Pope, “the true alternative is not between enthusiasm and fear, but between two paths of development: a progress that serves individuals and peoples, or a progress that subjects them to the mentality of power” (129). An ecology of communication and the centrality of schools: In the fourth chapter—Safeguarding Humanity at a Time of Transformation. Truth, Work, Freedom—the Pope calls for an “ecology of communication” based on truth. He urges transparency in how content is selected, protection of personal data, serious journalism founded on argumentation and verification, a new awareness in the “proper and critical” use of digital tools, and the integration of different forms of knowledge. The Church must also embody transparent and honest communication, especially in cases of injustice and abuse. The Pope also appeals for a renewed educational alliance, so that the “desire to ask questions” may not be extinguished in young people by perfect machines that make human thought seem useless (140). Pope Leo XIV, therefore, calls for renewed attention to schools as places where people learn to “seek and love the truth” (147). The dignity of work: In the “fourth industrial revolution” represented by the digital transition, the Pope emphasizes the importance of protecting the dignity of work by designing systems centered on the person and not only on performance. “The ‘new ways’ of working are not necessarily better,” he writes, “while AI promises to boost productivity by taking over mundane tasks, it frequently forces workers to adapt to the speed and demands of machines, rather than machines being designed to support those who work” (150). Technology can certainly free human beings from burdensome or repetitive tasks, but it must not lead to unemployment in the name of reducing costs and increasing profit. In this regard, the Pope expresses his hopes for a renewal of labor organizations (155). Peace and development: Pope Leo then notes the need to move beyond GDP as the measure of a country’s level of development, focusing instead on the dignity of work, shared prosperity, the reduction of inequalities, and environmental protection. Finance, he says, must focus on the development, creation, and evolution of work (159-160). Following in the footsteps of Pope St. Paul VI, the encyclical underscores the interdependence between peace and development. It calls for international cooperation capable of defining shared strategies, especially in favor of the most vulnerable countries and groups, because prosperity contributes to peace “only if it is widespread, inclusive, and sustainable” (163). The family, “primary social good”: The Pope upholds the role of the family, saying it is founded on the stable union between a man and a woman. The family is a “primary social good” and the “fundamental and irreplaceable cell of every community organization” (165), which must be supported, including through labor policies that favor stability and humane rhythms, so as to protect society’s ability to “build the future.” ‘Architecture of visibility’ and risks for freedom: Pope Leo XIV then discusses the theme of human freedom in an age when digital platforms are designed to capture users’ time and exploit their vulnerabilities. He reiterates the need to strengthen each person’s interior freedom, while also confronting the risk of social control arising from the mass collection of data and the use of algorithmic systems. Profiling, predicting, and directing behavior, he says, is “a new form of power” (171) that risks discriminating against the weakest. The Pope particularly criticizes the “architecture of visibility,” which amplifies only what is visible and shapes opinions. New forms of slavery and colonialism: AI also generates new forms of slavery, such as that of the “scarred, injured, and worn down” bodies (173) of those who work in the extraction of the “rare earth elements” needed for technology. Therefore, the Pope upholds the importance of combating new forms of slavery as another “decisive test for ethical discernment” in the digital transformation. Pope Leo XIV stresses that “the Church renews her firm condemnation of every form of slavery, trafficking, and commodification of persons” and he underscores that to not react or to tolerate grave violations of human dignity means becoming accomplices to them. At the same time, the Pope “sincerely asks forgiveness” for the delay with which the Church in the past condemned “the scourge of slavery” (174-176). The encyclical also refers to the vital information—for example, on health and demographics—used to guide economic strategies. He calls this a new face of colonialism that turns personal lives into exploitable information, making the digital environment a “space of exploitation” (178-179). Overcoming ‘just war’ theory: In the fifth chapter—The Culture of Power and the Civilization of Love—Pope Leo XIV turns his gaze to war, saying “the digital revolution is changing the nature of conflict.” The Pope calls for an ethical approach, without which decisions about the life and death of persons will become increasingly impersonal due to a use of force regarded as an “immediate and viable option” (182-183). At the root of all this is a “culture of power” that normalizes war and rehabilitates it as an “instrument of international politics,” favoring rearmament. Today, he says, public opinion is burdened by polarizing media narratives, as well as by “a disconcerting loss of historical memory,” which leaves people without a long-term vision (191). Consequently, he says, peace today is no longer understood as a task to be undertaken, but as an interval between conflicts. For this reason, Pope Leo XIV reiterates that—while preserving the right to legitimate defense in the strictest sense—the theory of “just war” must be overcome, and dialogue, diplomacy, and forgiveness must instead be promoted (192). Algorithms do not make war morally acceptable: Pope Leo expresses criticism of the growth in the arms industry, the nuclear arms race, and the emergence of new armed actors—including jihadist groups—who aim to perpetuate conflicts as a source of power and profit. He also warns against the use of weapons linked to AI, because “there is no algorithm that can make war morally acceptable.” The Pope writes, “AI does not remove the intrinsic inhumanity of conflict; indeed, it can only bring about conflict more quickly and render it more impersonal, lowering the threshold for resorting to violence, transforming defense into threat prediction and thus reducing victims to data. In this way, it will accustom us to the idea that violence is inevitable and needs only to be optimized.” The Pope urges strict ethical limits, which are shared at the international level and based on personal responsibility and the protection of civilians. “Any technology that facilitates attacks without seeing the face of human beings lowers the moral threshold of conflict” (199). Crisis of multilateralism: The culture of power also emerges from the crisis of multilateralism and the emergence of “a disorderly and conflict-ridden multipolarism” with a prevailing sense of mistrust (201). The Pope laments that the rule of law has been replaced by the law of the strongest, while the logic of power prevails over peace building and institutions established to safeguard the common destiny of peoples have now been weakened. In this regard, the Pope hopes for “profound reforms” of the UN that can overcome the current crisis of values in favor of the common good (226). An irresponsible Realpolitik: The encyclical notes that today “hybrid” wars are fought “also on the economic, financial and cyber fronts, where disinformation and campaigns that feed people’s fears are used to manipulate public opinion” so that increases in military expenditures are seen as the “only response” to an uncertain future. But all of this is only a “false realism”, an irresponsible Realpolitik that sows in people’s consciences and cultures a resignation to an unavoidable war and describes peace as a utopia (204-205). He notes that there is the possibility that some “may consider armed conflict as an effective way of diverting attention from domestic problems and a cynical tool for managing difficulties (208). The civilization of love: Christians, says Pope Leo, are called to respond to the culture of power by building “the civilization of love” and by choosing whether to feed the logic of force or safeguard peace. He recalls the memory of the saints, “righteous people and the oft-forgotten peacemakers, show us that grace does not magically eliminate conflict, but instead it inspires active resistance to evil and an astonishing creativity in doing good” (211). The Pope indicates five paths of responsibility, which include disarming words by speaking the truth; building peace in justice; adopting the perspective of victims by taking a stand, because there are conflicts in which “it is unjust to remain neutral”; cultivating “a healthy realism” that seeks practicable paths of peace through deeds, not only words. Importance of interreligious dialogue: Finally, relaunching dialogue by moving from a culture of power to a culture of negotiation is highlighted. And of decisive importance is “interreligious dialogue”, being bearers of a message of peace. He writes that “those who use the name of God to legitimize terrorism, violence or war betray his true nature, for to fight in the name of religion means attacking religion itself” (223). The diplomacy of the Holy See, he notes, “adopts the Gospel’s principle of mercy as a concrete criterion for political action.” And from this, the exhortation to prayer, since peace comes above all from God (227-228)." (https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2026-05/pope-leo-xiv-encyclical-magnifica-humanitas-ai.html) more

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Advancing Open Source AI in India: Recommendations for Governments & Technology Developers

Aarushi Gupta, Anushka Jain, Urvashi Aneja, Shreeja Sen

Bonn; Delhi; Noida (IN): Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); FAIR Forward – Artificial Intelligence for All; NASSCOM (2026), 80 pp.

"[...] this brief positions open source AI as a strategic policy option within India’s evolving AI ecosystem. It unpacks the critical importance of openness for India’s digital future, crystallising the key opportunities it offers to governments and developers alike. In doing so, it also explore ... more

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Handbook on Anthropology and Artificial Intelligence
Deep Insights

Sahana Udupa, Peter Hervik (eds.)

Cheltenham (UK); Northampton, MA (US): Edward Elgar Publishing (2026), xix, 495 pp.

"This timely Handbook provides a groundbreaking collection of anthropological research on artificial intelligence (AI), examining how anthropology can help to comprehend and critique its development. Evaluating the limits, hopes and fears of AI, leading experts explore its influence as a sociocultur ... more

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Hallo, wie fühlst du dich heute? Wie künstliche Intelligenz unsere Beziehungen verändert

Christoph Koch

Zürich: Kein & Aber (2026), 272 pp.

"Christoph Koch hat ein Jahr lang mit Menschen gesprochen, die mit KI leben — mit denen, die sich verlieben, denen, die trauern, denen, die Chatbots als Therapie nutzen. Er hat mit KI-Forscherinnen und Psychologen geredet. Mit Anwälten und Geschädigten. Und mit den Maschinen selbst. Herausgekomm ... more

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How to Talk to AI (And How Not To)

Jamie Bartlett

London: Ebury Publishing (2026), 272 pp.

"[...] Most people still don't really understand how AI works, how to make the most of it – or what the dangers are. As some people use it to turbo-charge their productivity at work, others are falling into dangerous conspiracies, delusions and psychosis. In How to Talk to AI, award-winning techno ... more

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Why Silicon Valley is turning to the Catholic Church: Priests and theologians want to shape the future of AI. Big Tech is listening

Elias Wachtel

The Atlantic, April 25 (2026)

"Silicon Valley and the Vatican may “seem like strange bedfellows”—but they each have something to gain from the other, @EliasWachtel argues. He examines why Big Tech is listening to priests and theologians who want to shape the future of AI." (Publisher description)

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Promoting and advancing human rights in global AI ecosystems: The need for a comprehensive framework under international law

Alexander Kriebitz, Caitlin C. Corrigan (eds.)

Globethics Foundation; Responsible AI Network – Africa (RAIN-Africa) (2026), 33 pp.

"In response to far-reaching societal impacts of AI, policymakers are increasingly adopting a human rights lens for AI governance. However, the regulatory landscape remains fragmented and characterized by Western led initiatives as well as inconsistent enforcement. To address these limitations, a un ... ified and binding international framework is urgently needed. The proposed Convention on AI, Data, and Human Rights (drafted as the “Munich Convention on AI, Data, and Human Rights”) is an initiative toward such a framework. Developed with contributions from over 50 global experts, it proposes an international convention to align AI governance with human rights principles. This whitepaper explores the underlying rationale behind the convention, emphasizing its alignment with the norms and principles articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter. It examines the relevance of safeguards against AI’s misuse in facilitating human rights violations, with particular focus on protecting underrepresented or marginalized groups, including indigenous peoples, and addressing collective rights. It furthermore points to the necessity to codify rights that empower individuals to opt out, be forgotten, seek explanations, and access remedies to maintain adequate human rights standards in the context of AI. The urgency to act arises from the escalating impact of AI and the rapid pace of political and technological advancements. The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is particularly well poised to play a leading role in initiating global discussions on a binding convention for AI governance, grounded in human rights principles. Drawing on its established mandate to uphold human rights globally, the UNHRC has a record of successfully embedding human rights principles into international frameworks, as demonstrated by its endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the recognition of the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. Through dedicated action around promoting a convention on AI and human rights, the UNHRC can foster international consensus and proactively shape the future of AI in a manner that prioritizes the values and principles enshrined in the key documents of international human rights law." (Executive summary) more

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Justicia algorítmica en América Latina y el Caribe: Investigación, políticas públicas y ética de la inteligencia artificial

Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO); CIESPAL; UNESCO (2026), 105 pp.

"El volumen reúne los policy briefs elaborados en el marco de la convocatoria Justicia Algorítmica. Una inteligencia artificial ética para América Latina y el Caribe, lanzada conjuntamente por UNESCO Ecuador y el Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO), en el marco de una colaborac ... ión intensa, sostenida y productiva que ambas instituciones han consolidado en los últimos años. A ella se sumó El Centro Internacional de Estudios Superiores de Comunicación para América Latina, CIESPAL, responsable de la edición del libro en alianza con CLACSO y UNESCO, reafirmando la convicción de que la cooperación interinstitucional regional constituye un instrumento fundamental para pensar críticamente la tecnología, fortalecer la cultura democrática y promover políticas públicas capaces de atender a los grupos más vulnerables. Los trabajos seleccionados y aquí publicados son el resultado de un proceso riguroso, sistemático y situado: se recibieron 35 postulaciones, evaluadas en primera instancia por un Comité Internacional integrado por nueve especialistas provenientes de Ecuador, Argentina, Brasil y Francia. Posteriormente, UNESCO y CLACSO realizaron la revisión final atendiendo a la calidad técnica y científica, la coherencia metodológica, la consistencia del plan de trabajo y la pertinencia de los temas en relación con la Recomendación sobre la Ética de la IA y el equilibrio regional. El proceso concluyó con la selección de cinco propuestas, varias de ellas con participación de investigadoras e investigadores con trabajo en y sobre Ecuador. Los policy briefs que conforman este libro abordan problemas urgentes de la agenda regional sobre IA. Uno de los núcleos críticos es la transformación del trabajo y la desigualdad digital, un fenómeno particularmente agudo en América Latina y el Caribe, donde históricas brechas educativas, económicas y territoriales se ven amplificadas por una automatización que concentra oportunidades en sectores altamente especializados y desplaza tareas tradicionalmente realizadas por trabajadores menos calificados. La región enfrenta una doble asimetría: la del acceso desigual a tecnologías avanzadas y la de las capacidades necesarias para utilizarlas de modo significativo, reproduciendo patrones de exclusión que atraviesan género, etnia y condición socioeconómica. Otro foco central es la privacidad y la vigilancia algorítmica, ámbitos donde los riesgos son crecientes. La implementación de sistemas opacos —las conocidas “cajas negras” algorítmicas— que procesan datos personales a gran escala ha generado nuevas formas de discriminación, como el racismo algorítmico, sesgos de género, o modelos predictivos que penalizan a grupos históricamente vulnerados. Los casos de identificación errónea en sistemas de reconocimiento facial o la clasificación automatizada de supuestos “riesgos sociales” muestran que, sin marcos éticos y normativos sólidos, la IA puede reforzar desigualdades en vez de corregirlas." (Introducción, páginas 8-9) more

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The People-Centered AI Playbook. Playbook Capsule

Dalberg Data Insights (2026), 44 pp.

"This people-centered playbook [...] is designed to give you the essentials of AI adoption in a quick, accessible format, with core concepts, foundational steps, and key frameworks without overwhelming detail. Built for impact-driven teams in low-resource or non-tech-first contexts, it answers the m ... more

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Standardization of AI Ethics: Stakeholders, Values and Profit

Nicholas Kluge Corrêa, Julia Maria Mönig (eds.)

Bielefeld: transcript Verlag (2026), 161 pp.

"[...] what a certification could look like is only one of the questions that should be asked when discussing ethical certification of AI. Furthermore, how all potentially concerned parties (stakeholders) can be included, which values might be affected, and what this means for those actors who (righ ... tfully) need and want to profit from AI applications were central questions that the philosophy team of the KI. NRW-flagship project „Zertifizierte KI“ (Certified AI) investigated. Further key questions raised in the contributions and throughout the project period include: Can ethics be standardized? Who audits the auditors? How can auditing institutions be aligned with actual societal concerns? What can an assessment look like for a specific area (e.g., human resources)? How are law and ethics intertwined? Which contribution can philosophy provide, now that there is a European regulation on Artificial Intelligence (e.g., in the discussion whether robots in elderly care should be considered as deceptive technology under the AI Act)? Finally, what role do standardization bodies play in ensuring trustworthy AI? Answers to these questions are presented in this book, as well as in the project’s central outcomes: the 'Catalogue of General Ethical Requirements for AI Certification' and the 'Catalogue of Field-Specific Requirements for AI Certification'. The 'Catalogue of General Ethical Requirements for AI Certification' provides a structured framework for trustworthy AI development, identifying overarching ethical requirements for AI certification and outlining six ethical values: fairness, privacy, robustness, sustainability, transparency, and truthfulness. For each value, the project team researched existing tools, metrics, and approaches to help developers, programmers, and other practitioners build trustworthy AI systems. The 'Catalogue of Field-Specific Requirements for AI Certification' offers a list of requirements, an ethical stakeholder analysis, and a discussion of potential value tensions for six exemplary fields: arts, biometric profiling, industry and critical infrastructure, law enforcement, medicine and care and social media, a list of requirements, an ethical stakeholder analyses and a discussion of potential value tensions. The volume at hand collects the contributions to the final conference of the sub-project philosophy of the KI.NRW-Flagship-Projekt “Zertifizierte KI”. (Introduction, pages 11-12) more

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How Russia Is Reshaping Command and Control for AI-Enabled Warfare

Kateryna Bondar

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2026), 20 pp.

"This paper examines how Russia is transforming its command and control (C2) architecture under wartime pressure, how these changes shape the country’s incremental move toward battlefield-required software solutions, and what lessons U.S. policymakers can learn from Russia’s experiences. Focusin ... g on both strategic ambitions and battlefield practice, the takeaways below summarize how automated C2 systems, unmanned platform management software, and emerging AI applications are being developed, adapted, and scaled within Russia’s military ecosystem. 1. Russia is no longer prioritizing the construction of a single, comprehensive automated C2 architecture comparable to Western joint concepts; instead, it is reallocating effort toward tactical, task-specific software, driven by battlefield necessity. Prolonged, high-intensity combat in Ukraine exposed the limits of centralized, system-wide C2 modernization and elevated the importance of accelerating the tactical kill chain. The emergence of systems such as the “Svod” Tactical Situational Awareness Complex and other integrated reconnaissance-strike tools reflects a pragmatic shift in which operational control of unmanned systems and real-time battlefield management now deliver greater military value than achieving end-to-end C2 integration. 2. Because unmanned systems now conduct up to 80 percent of Russian fire missions, the center of gravity in C2 innovation has shifted toward software that manages drones and integrates them with artillery and other fire units. Civilian engineers and volunteer developers have focused on closing this gap by building tools that provide situational awareness, automate fire correction, and link unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operators directly to firing units. Russia’s “Glaz/Groza” software complex demonstrates this trend, functioning as a unified reconnaissance-strike workflow that converts drone footage into targeting data and compresses the time from detection to impact from hours to minutes. 3. The Russian military assesses its AI capabilities for visual and audio data processing as relatively mature, placing computer vision, sensor fusion, and signal analysis at technology readiness level (TRL) 6–9, while natural-language processing remains at an early, experimental stage, TRL 1–3. This disparity reflects a deliberate prioritization of AI applications that deliver immediate battlefield utility—such as target recognition, guidance, and autonomous terminal functions for unmanned systems—and where abundant data and combat validation are available. By contrast, text analysis AI, which underpins document processing and higher-level C2 decision support, remains constrained by immature architectures, limited certified software, and organizational barriers, slowing progress toward fully AI-enabled command workflows. 4. Within Russian C2 systems, AI is primarily envisioned as a support function rather than a replacement for human decisionmaking. Russian military doctrine assigns AI two core roles: enhancing the processing and interpretation of sensor data and providing predictive decision support through forecasting, scenario generation, and recommendations for commanders. Across strategic and tactical levels, AI is intended to augment situational awareness and analytical capacity, while formal authority and responsibility for decisions remain firmly with human commanders. 5. Russia began its C2 digitalization effort by building a dense layer of standards governing terminology, system architecture, hardware-software integration, and information management. This standardization drive, coupled with the transition to the domestically controlled Astra Linux operating system, reflects an attempt to create a unified technical foundation capable of supporting data integration, interoperability, and future AI insertion across the command hierarchy. While this framework provides structural coherence, it has not, on its own, resolved deeper institutional and methodological constraints that continue to limit system-wide C2 integration. 6. To enable AI-driven tactical software, the Russian military launched a systematic data collection effort in 2025 focused on unmanned operations and strike outcomes. The emerging data infrastructure aggregates UAS video feeds, operator telemetry, strike effects, and individual pilot performance metrics, each linked to unique personal identifiers. These datasets serve multiple functions simultaneously: operational analysis, training evaluation, and the creation of labeled data for AI model development, establishing a feedback loop that ties battlefield performance directly to software refinement. 7. Despite efforts to reduce dependence on foreign commercial technologies, Russia’s military AI development remains heavily reliant on open-weight models and civilian software ecosystems. The transition from tools such as AlpineQuest and Discord toward domestic alternatives like ZOV Maps and Astra-based platforms reflects a push for security and sovereignty at the application layer. At the same time, Russian developers actively adapt open-weight and commercially available AI models, including Mistral, Qwen, LLaMA, YOLO, and related architectures, for military use, embedding them into on-premise, tightly controlled environments. This hybrid approach allows Russia to mitigate sanctions and accelerate AI adoption without building foundational models from scratch." (Executive summary) more

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Critiquing Generative AI in Africa's Media Ecosystems

Lungile A. Tshuma, Trust Matsilele

London; New York: Routledge (2026), 215 pp.

"The book argues that as technology is a social construct reflecting existing power dynamics, those in the Global South, and in Africa in particular, are bound to be marginalised and have their knowledge, systems overlooked as the Global North dominates technological developments. The birth of AI ha ... more

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The Essential Convergence: Global Compact on Extreme AI Risks

Sundeep Waslekar, Ilmas Futehally, Jayantika Kutty

Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group (2026), 90 pp.

"Supply-Side Governance: Progress and Limitations: Most existing AI governance frameworks focus on the supply side of the technology ecosystem. These measures regulate developers, model providers, and infrastructure operators responsible for building advanced systems. Supply-side mechanisms include: ... pre-deployment safety testing and red-teaming; model evaluation and capability assessments; transparency and reporting obligations; incident response mechanisms; restrictions on certain high-risk uses. Several jurisdictions are experimenting with these tools in different combinations. China has implemented regulatory standards for generative AI systems; the European Union has adopted a risk based regulatory framework; Brazil and South Korea are developing legislative approaches; and the United States has introduced a mixture of executive measures and sectoral rules. These frameworks represent important progress. However, they face two structural limitations. First, supply-side regulation depends heavily on the cooperation of a small number of developer states. Second, the growing distribution of AI models, through open-weight releases, cloud APIs, and downstream applications, means that many systems reach global markets beyond the jurisdiction where they were originally developed. This reality limits the effectiveness of purely supply-side approaches. Demand-Side Governance: A New Dimension of AI Regulation: The paper introduces a second dimension of governance that has received far less attention: demand-side oversight. Demand-side governance shifts the locus of control from the point of creation to the point of deployment. Instead of relying solely on developer-state regulations, importing countries can establish safety requirements for any AI systems operating within their markets. These requirements may include risk assessments, certification standards, procurement rules, insurance obligations, and infrastructure safeguards. The central insight is that states controlling large consumer markets, digital infrastructure, financial systems, or public procurement channels possess significant leverage over global AI deployment, even if they do not develop frontier models themselves. This demand-side leverage can reshape incentives across the global AI ecosystem. Developers seeking access to major markets must comply with the safety conditions imposed by importing states. This approach represents a strategic shift in global AI governance: from a developer-centric model to a market-driven model of safety enforcement. Countries across different regions possess different forms of demand-side power. Brazil and South Africa represent large emerging markets; the United Arab Emirates plays a major role in AI infrastructure investment; South Korea combines technological capability with advanced regulatory institutions. When coordinated, these forms of leverage could help establish global safety norms. The Case for a Global Compact: Given the limitations of purely national approaches, the paper proposes the development of a Global Compact on Extreme AI Risks. The Compact would not aim to harmonise all aspects of AI regulation. Instead, it would focus narrowly on the most severe risk categories and establish shared mechanisms for prevention, monitoring, and response. Five institutional pillars form the backbone of the proposed Compact. The five pillars in the Global Compact should not be treated as isolated measures but designed as an interoperable system in which each pillar reinforces and informs the others through shared definitions, compatible standards, and coordinated implementation mechanisms. To address extreme risks effectively, the Compact should rest on a small set of guiding principles: a human-centric principle to ensure protection of humanity and human dignity as the primary objective; technological neutrality so that safeguards apply across methods and architectures rather than specific tools; interoperability to enable national and regional AI frameworks to exchange information, align risk classifications, and coordinate responses; and mutual cooperation to institutionalize cross-border collaboration in prevention, incident reporting, and crisis management. These can be complemented by principles of proportional risk governance, scientific integrity, and shared responsibility, creating a coherent normative base that allows diverse governance models to function together as a connected global safety architecture." (Executive summary, pages 5-6) more

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Step by Step: How SAFE AI contributes to trustworthy AI

CDAC Network; Alan Turing Institute; Humanitarian AI Advisory (2026), 8 pp.

"Based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework, the seven characteristics of trustworthy AI are: 1. Valid and Reliable: The AI system should perform as intended, delivering accurate results consistently across different situations. 2. Safe: The sy ... more

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AI Companions Reduce Loneliness

Julian De Freitas, Zeliha Oğuz-Uğuralp, Ahmet Kaan Uğuralp, Stefano Puntoni

Journal of Consumer Research, volume 52, issue 6 (2026), pp. 1126–1148

"Chatbots are now able to engage in sophisticated conversations with consumers in the domain of relationships, providing a potential coping solution to widescale societal loneliness. Behavioral research provides little insight into whether these applications (apps) are effective at alleviating lonel ... more

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Generative AI and democracy: Study on advantages and risks of the use of generative artificial intelligence in public debate and democratic processes

Natali Helberger, Claes de Vreese, Gionata Bouche, Agustin Ferrari Braun, Max van Drunen, Simon Kruschinski, Nicolas Mattis, Sophie Morosoli, Laurens Naudts, Charis Papaevangelou, Theresa Seipp, Fabio Votta, Teresa Weikmann

Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Steering Committee on Democracy (CDDM) (2026), 77 pp.

"The key finding of this report is that it is not enough to make sure that the technology is safe and no risk to human rights and public values. GenAI’s impact and potential for the realisation of fundamental rights depends on the societal, organisation and regulatory context in which it operates, ... the possibility for institutions to make value-driven choices and regulators that actively promote public innovation where the interests of society as a whole outweigh purely economic interests of a concentrated handful of technology companies. This report has made the argument that GenAI and its implications for human rights and democracy must be seen in the context of the configurations of infrastructural and political power, and who is able and entitled to decide the course and character of innovation. [...] The report makes a number of recommendations to the Council of Europe: 1. Provide substantive guidance and standardisation: As a human rights organisation, the Council of Europe is particularly well prepared to develop more substantive guidance and identify, concretise and monitor risks to democracy, human rights and political equality, be that in the way GenAI is used in democratic practices like elections, the more structural implications for democratic institutions (such as the free press) as well as the democratic governance of AI. Next to a focus on risks, the Council of Europe can also usefully develop guidance how AI can advance democracy and human rights and develop a value-driven interpretation of “public interest innovation” to inform States, companies and standardisation processes. 2. Incentivise and enable public interest innovation: Next to the risked-based approach to AI that is also enshrined in the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention, the Council of Europe could develop guidance on policies and governance approaches that enable and incentivise public interest innovation. It could help identify the democratic and human rights implications of procurement choices, and develop narratives to prioritize value-oriented innovation, open-source datasets, decentralisation and interoperability above the promotion of scale and innovation driven by a concentrated number of technology companies. 3. Strengthen democratic resilience and ability to govern: The Council of Europe, and the CDDEM specifically, could have an important role in exploring mechanisms and regulatory solutions to map and remedy existing dependencies and identify mission-critical elements of a European digital ecosystem, for example through monitoring the use of GenAI in elections, stimulating the development of public interest information infrastructures and strengthening the ability of states to develop democratic and inclusive ways of governing GenAI. Next to digital autonomy, empowering public accountability actors like civil society, equality bodies, academics or investigative reporters to participate in the governance of the digital transformation are critical conditions for strengthening democratic resilience. Finally, democratic resilience also means enabling more meaningful citizen engagement, including of otherwise often marginalised groups, for example through transparency, literacy and meaningful participation in decision making." (Executive summary) more

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Artificial Intelligence for Older Adults: Concepts, Needs and Practices of Use

Diana Dutsyk

Kyiv: Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute (2026), 18 pp.

"To better understand the attitudes of older adults toward artificial intelligence, as well as to identify their needs in using it, we conducted focus group discussions, the results of which are presented in this analytical report. Overall, these discussions showed that there is often a stereotypica ... more

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Navigating risks and rewards: How South African journalists use AI in the newsroom

Karen Allen, Herman Wasserman, Nande Mbekela

Johannesburg; Stellenbosch: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Media Programme Sub-Saharan Africa; Centre for Information Integrity in Africa (CINIA) (2026), 33 pp.

"This study demonstrates impressively how widely AI is already used in South African newsrooms – often, however, without systematic training, without editorial guidelines, and without tools adapted to African languages and contexts. The interviews make it clear that journalists stand between curio ... more

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