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Russian Disinformation Efforts on Social Media

Elina Treyger, Joe Cheravitch, Raphael S. Cohen

Santa Monica: RAND Corporation (2022), xviii, 202 pp.

"We sought to better understand Russia's disinformation on social media and generate recommendations to better meet and counter this evolving threat. We relied on an analysis of Russian military literature, investigative efforts, official reports, academic and policy literature, media reporting, and ... more

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Vibrant Information Barometer: Europe & Eurasia
Deep Insights

Washington, DC: IREX (2022), 348 pp.

"The 2022 Europe and Eurasia Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE) sees the addition of the five countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) to the study, bringing the total number of countries examined to 18. With VIBE, IREX strives to capture a moder ... more

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Limitations of Anti-War Messaging Oriented at Russians

Fyodor Krashennikov

Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (2022), 11 pp.

"This paper offers a critical overview of anti-war propaganda in the Russian language during the first six months of the war and identifies the reasons for its limited success. After a review of the challenges to current forms of propaganda, the paper offers practical recommendations to improve the ... more

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Maidan, Krim und Russland: Eine Medien-Frame-Analyse deutscher Print-Berichterstattung im Februar und März 2014

Kinza Khan

Baden-Baden: Nomos (2022), 314 pp.

"Maidan, Krim und Russland bilden 2014 einen Fokus der Berichterstattung, als Proteste v. a. in Kiew in eine Staatskrise münden und die Halbinsel Krim von Russland annektiert wird. Diese einschneidenden Ereignisse werden von Medien eingeordnet und in Sinnzusammenhänge eingebettet. Die vorliegende ... more

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Russia: Journalistic Investigations Under Attack

Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan

Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2022), 16 pp.

"For more than 30 years, investigative journalism has been playing a role in Russian society much bigger than it has ever had in traditional emocracies. Gorbachev’s reforms started with Glasnost (‘Openness’), when many journalists became household names. The problem was that there were no stan ... more

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The Vladimirror Network: Pro-Putin Power-Users on Facebook

Moustafa Ayad

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2022), 11 pp.

"Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) researchers identified key pro-Putin accounts with two or more duplicates engaged in administering, moderating, and contributing to large public Facebook groups with hundreds of thousands of members fawning over the Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russia ... more

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Russian Information Warfare

Russian Analytical Digest, issue 282 (2022), 23 pp.

"Over the past decade, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has employed unorthodox foreign policy tools with increasing frequency, intensity, and success. Perhaps the most effective of these tactics has been the use of information warfare designed to affect decision-making in countries Russia considers to be ... more

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Russian Social Network VK Gains Carte Blanche Following the Closure of Instagram and Facebook in the Country

Daria Zakharova

Russian Analytical Digest, issue 280 (2022), pp. 20-21

"As the Russian invasion of Ukraine erupted, the country’s authorities declared a war on Western social media as well. In March, such social media giants as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram were blocked in Russia, giving their local competitor—named VK—a virtual monopoly in the country. Millio ... more

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Russia – YouTube and Global Platforms: A New Battleground for Russian Journalists and Bloggers

Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan

Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2022), 13 pp.

"In the late 2010s, the Internet overtook television as the most popular media format in Russia. It was also the time when Russian-speaking YouTube went political: well-known bloggers started producing political content, opposition politicians became the most popular YouTubers, and finally mainstrea ... more

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Rivalry in the Information Sphere: Russian Conceptions of Information Confrontation

Michelle Grisé, Alyssa Demus, Yuliya Shokh, Marta Kepe, Jonathan William Welburn, Christina Golins'ka

Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation (2022), xvi, 138 pp.

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Russian Church in the Digital Era: Mediatization of Orthodoxy

Hanna Stähle

Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge (2022), xii, 224 pp.

"Has Russia abandoned its atheist past and embraced Orthodox Christianity as its new moral guide? The reality is more complex and contradictory. Digital sources provide evidence of rising domestic criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church and its leadership. This book offers a nuanced understanding o ... more

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Russia: "You Will be Arrested Anyway." Reprisals Against Monitors and Media Workers Reporting from Protests

London: Amnesty International (2022), 48 pp.

"This document looks into the human rights violations committed against two specific groups who play important roles for the enjoyment of the right to peaceful assembly. The first group – public assembly monitors – performs a watchdog function by recording how rigorously the authorities observe ... more

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The Unfreedom Monitor: Russia Country Report

Amsterdam: Global Voices Advox (2022), 28 pp.

"The internet gained centrality as a space of public opinion and political activity that became important for the Russian state to co-opt and control as part of the broader push for control of political elites and public perceptions as Putin and his ruling party pushed to eliminate any functioning o ... more

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Ukrainekrieg auf Telegram: Rechtsextremer Knotenpunkt für Desinformationen und Verschwörungserzählungen

Mainz: jugendschutz.net (2022), 9 pp.

"Seit Beginn des russischen Angriffskriegs gegen die Ukraine im Februar 2022 nutzen Rechtsextreme die Ereignisse und Entwicklungen für ihre Propaganda. Dabei lassen sich sowohl pro-ukrainische als auch prorussische Positionierungen beobachten. Insbesondere werden gezielt Desinformationen und Versch ... more

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Online Russian-Language Hate and Discrimination Against Central Asian Migrants: Challenges and Ways Forward

Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2022), 16 pp.

"The Strong Cities Network (SCN) conducted an online investigation into the scale and scope of Russian-language stigmatisation and abuse of Central Asian labour migrants. Through a mixed-methods approach that combined natural-language processing technology with manual qualitative research, the SCN w ... more

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Russlands unabhängiger Journalismus: Der harte Überlebenskampf unter totalitären Repressionsmaßnahmen

Sergej Parkhomenko

Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (2022), 39 pp.

"Der Journalist und Verleger Sergej Parkhomenko ist ein international gefeierter Menschenrechtsverteidiger, Oppositionsaktivist und unter den russischen Medienschaffenden einer der wichtigsten Partner für das Internationale Journalisten- und Mediendialogprogramm (IJMD) der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftun ... more

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The Kremlin's Troll Network Never Sleeps: Inauthentic Pro-Kremlin Online Behavior on Facebook in Germany, Italy, Romania and Hungary

Lóránt Gyori, Csaba Molnár, Péter Krekó, Patrik Szicherle et al.

Budapest: Political Capital Institute (2022), 36 pp.

"The research – based on programmatic text-mining supported analyses of several millions of war-related comments scraped by Sentione and further examined with CrowdTangle - found traces of inauthentic, repetitive pro-Kremlin activity on Facebook in all countries under review, which can be consider ... ed attempts to influence public opinion in the affected states and, in some cases, beyond them. Our main conclusions are: Crises help the Kremlin. Even if public opinion in the EU is currently unfavorable to the Kremlin, the onset of high, permanent inflation, soaring energy prices and the looming danger of an EU-wide recession could create a more favorable environment for the Kremlin’s propaganda efforts. Most (covertly) Kremlin-friendly forces will adopt a rhetoric blasting sanctions for harming Europe more than Russia. Importing disinformation narratives. Three out of the four narratives found in Hungary were imported into the country from abroad. One doubting Ukraine’s existence as a country started from an organization connected to Ukrainian pro-Putin oligarch Viktor Medvechuk, taken over by the so-called “news agency” of separatists. Another narrative detailing a new, dictatorial world order based on, among others, COVID-19 restrictions, and led by NATO was aimed at developing countries where Russia can hope to hold more sway. The third essentially took over a trend in the Russian media space: users tried to discredit anti-war voices by asking them “where they were in the past eight years” when Ukraine committed atrocities against minorities. Strategies in Germany: Divide and Rule. The six relevant narratives we found in Germany employed three different strategies. The first was anti-Westernism, where the US and NATO are to blame for Russia’s attack. The second aimed clearly at generating debates by spreading a Kremlin-critical narrative. Some profiles involved in this were caught disseminating both pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin narratives, which indicates it is not intended to counter the Kremlin’s information operation but to be a part of it. The third strategy was about exploiting contemporary events - such as heightened discussions on sanctions and rising inflation." (Executive summary) more

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Russland im Spiegel der Medien: Eine Diskursanalyse der deutschen Presse 1999 bis 2016

Danny Schmidt

Berlin: Frank & Timme (2022), 562 pp.

"Danny Schmidt analysiert, wie führende deutsche Medien über Russland schreiben. Artikel der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung, des Neuen Deutschlands, des Spiegels, der Süddeutschen Zeitung und der Welt zeichnen ein deutliches Bild. Der Blickwinkel ist verengt, die Perspektivenvielfalt reduziert, ... more

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The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming? Russia’s Growing Presence in Africa and its Implication for European Policy

Guido Lanfranchi, Kars de Bruijne

The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' (2022), 46 pp.

"The growth of Russia’s presence across Africa over the last decade has generated significant international concern, further exacerbated after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s engagement can affect the interests and policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states (MS) in Africa ... . How should European policymakers understand these developments and respond to them? To answer this question, this report looks at Russia’s engagement in Africa, reaching three main conclusions. First, Moscow’s engagement with Africa has so far remained limited as compared to that of other global players, particularly in the economic domain. The current level of (media) attention devoted to Russia’s role in Africa is thus not supported by sufficient evidence of its actual engagement in the continent. At the same time, however, the growth of Russia’s presence is a real trend. Second, Russian actors are guided by a rather loose strategy when it comes to Africa. The Russian state has some interests that act as a broad framework. However, the actual engagement is carried out not only by state actors, but also by state-backed conglomerates and politically connected private businesses. These latter actors have their own specific interests, which are not always fully aligned with those of the Russian state. While state actors are often driven by geopolitical considerations, Russian companies are more interested in economic opportunities. Third, Russia’s engagement in African countries is significantly shaped by the different national contexts and by the interests of African governments. For instance, in a strong state like Ethiopia, Russia’s engagement takes place exclusively at the governmental level. By contrast, in Sudan and Mali (contexts with weaker state structures), other Russian actors like private military companies (PMCs) and private businesses are involved. Yet, in all three cases, Moscow’s presence tends to grow when relations between African governments and their international partners (especially in the West) deteriorate, often in the wake of authoritarian turns. This shows the opportunistic nature of Russia’s engagement, as well as the complex trade-offs faced by EU/MS governments when engaging with African governments." (Executive summary) more

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Owning the Conversation: Assessing Responses to Russian and Chinese Information Operations Around COVID-19

Vera Zakem, Edward Lucas, James Lamond

Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) (2022), 32 pp.

"Russia and China have created and amplified disinformation and propaganda about COVID-19 worldwide to sow distrust and confusion and to reduce social cohesion among targeted audiences. The United States government, the European Union, and multinational organizations have developed a series of inter ... ventions in response. These include exposing disinformation, providing credible and authoritative public health information, imposing sanctions, investing in democratic resilience measures, setting up COVID-19 disinformation task forces, addressing disinformation through regulatory measures, countering emerging threat narratives from Russia and China, and addressing the vulnerabilities in the information and media environment. Digital platforms, including Twitter, Meta, YouTube, and TikTok, have stepped up to counter COVID-19 disinformation and misinformation via policy procedures, takedowns of inauthentic content, addition of new product features, and partner with civil society and multinational organizations to provide credible and reliable information to global audiences. In addition, digital platforms are addressing COVID-19-related disinformation and misinformation stemming from a variety of state and non-state actors, including China and Russia. Several of these initiatives have proven to be effective, including cross-sectoral collaboration to facilitate identification of the threat; enforcement actions between civil society, governments, and digital platforms; and investment in resilience mechanisms, including media literacy and online games to address disinformation. Despite some meaningful progress, gaps in countering COVID-19 disinformation and propaganda stemming from Russia and China and unintentional misinformation spread by everyday citizens still exist. Closing these gaps will require gaining a deeper understanding of how adversaries think; aligning and refining transatlantic regulatory approaches; building coordination and whole-of- society information-sharing mechanisms; expanding the use of sanctions to counter disinformation; localizing and contextualizing programs and technological solutions; strengthening societal resilience through media, digital literacy, and by addressing digital authoritarianism; and building and rebuilding trust in democratic institutions." (Executive summary) more

Vibrant Information Barometer: Europe & Eurasia Deep Insights

Vibrant Information Barometer: Europe & Eurasia
Deep Insights