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Disinformation Campaigns in Africa: Actors, Consequences, and Responses

Admire Mare, Allen Munoriyarwa

New York: Bloomsbury Publishing (2026), 262 pp.

"Centering disinformation campaigns in Africa, this book examines typologies of false and misleading information and assesses the devastating consequences of disinformation. Admire Mare and Allen Munoriyarwa cover the key actors, consequences of, and responses to combat disinformation campaigns th ... more

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Google Scholar (137)

WorldCat (121)

Disinformation: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis
Deep Insights

Lisa Ginsborg, Paula Gori (eds.)

Cham: Springer (2026), xvi, 654 pp.

"This volume provides a multidisciplinary analysis of disinformation and strategies for tackling it. Authored by a diverse group of scholars and experts, chapters in this volume are divided into three thematic sections. The first section delves into disinformation from various disciplinary perspecti ... more

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How civil society coalition-building affects information integrity during elections: evidence from four African countries

Dani Madrid-Morales, Herman Wasserman, Nicola Davies-Laubscher, Fatoumata Sow

Information, Communication & Society (2026), 18 pp.

"This article examines how civil society actors promote information integrity during elections through coalition-building, drawing on evidence from four African countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa) that held elections between 2022 and 2024. In these countrie ... more

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Mapping the information integrity landscape in West Africa: An annotated bibliography

Zara Schoeder, Liz Orembo, Marie Batista

Cape Town: Research ICT Africa (2025), 26 pp.

"This annotated bibliography is organised into four sections. Section 1 demonstrates how disinformation emerges as the most prominent topic in the literature on information integrity. Several different kinds of agents of disinformation operate within West Africaʼs information sphere. These range fr ... om political actors and interest groups to foreign entities and social media influencers. Each exploits social fault lines to sway public opinion, particularly in the lead-up to elections and during conflicts. An organised network of influence narratives – which can sometimes be complex and include both local and foreign disinformation-for-hire merchants complemented by a network of informed but polarised citizens – forms part of the machinery of political campaigns. This machinery transcends elections to become a way of governance as governments continue to rely on it to deflect accountability and manipulate public discourse. Section 2 describes the events around which information disorders are promoted. During periods of political instability, elections, or armed conflicts, information disorders often emerge as key drivers of mass action. In these contexts, disinformation and hate speech are weaponised to incite violence, manipulate public sentiment, and deepen ethnic and religious divisions. Ethnicity and religion frequently become fault lines that disinformation campaigns exploit to divide communities and trigger mass actions such as violent protests, or for widespread voter manipulation. In the case of elections, disinformation is used to sway voter opinions by distorting candidatesʼ positions or spreading fabricated narratives about political opponents. Likewise, in conflict situations, armed groups and militant organisations may use information disorders to recruit new members by promoting extremist ideologies, spreading fear, or creating a sense of urgency. Politicians and conflict groups alike have learned to manipulate these divisions for their agendas, making information integrity a critical issue for social cohesion, democratic stability, and peacebuilding in the region. Section 3 covers literature on fact-checking as one of the measures to mitigate information disorders. Artificial Intelligence (AI) can scale up fact-checking efforts by detecting and scaling up the distribution of correct information. However, even using AI for fact-checking experiences significant limitations. For example, local languages make it hard for AI to detect disinformation and hate speech in all instances. When misinformation is shared on instant messaging platforms like Telegram channels it is also difficult for an ordinary user to detect. Section 4 covers media literacy as an antidote to information disorders, especially disinformation. UNESCO has been at the forefront of addressing information integrity issues in West Africa through its research and media literacy programmes. Recognising the role of accurate and reliable information in fostering peace, democracy, and development, UNESCO has sought to promote the importance of information integrity by partnering with governments, civil society organisations, and media outlets to combat disinformation. Additionally, UNESCOʼs media literacy programmes aim to empower citizens with the skills to critically evaluate and engage with information, fostering a more informed and resilient public.8 These initiatives are particularly important in an era where digital media plays such a significant role in shaping opinions and driving political discourse." (Introduction, pages 3-4) more

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Tackling Disinformation, Information Manipulation and Interference in Four African Elections
Deep Insights

Dani Madrid-Morales, Herman Wasserman, Nicola Davies-Laubscher, Fatoumata Sow

Mapping Electoral Disinformation inAfrica (MEDiA); Centre for Information Integrity in Africa (CIIA); Stellenbosch University (2025), 58 pp.

"In recent years, electoral disinformation has followed several recurring patterns globally, many of which were observed in the case studies analysed in this report. One prominent tactic is attacks on electoral integrity, where political actors spread false claims about voter registration, election ... rigging, or external interference to delegitimise outcomes. As we show in this report, in the DRC, for example, rumours circulated that biometric voter registration was designed to expose individuals’ HIV status, discouraging participation. In South Africa, disinformation networks falsely claimed that the Electoral Commission (IEC) was manipulating results to favour the ruling party, fueling distrust in the electoral process. Another trend is the weaponisation of ethnic and gendered disinformation. In Kenya, misleading narratives framed certain candidates as “foreign-sponsored outsiders” to undermine their legitimacy, while in Senegal, false claims about morality were used to discredit opposition figures. Meanwhile, gendered disinformation—targeting women candidates with sexist tropes and false accusations—was a recurring feature in all four countries, reflecting a broader global pattern in which women in politics are disproportionately subjected to online abuse and misinformation. Social media platforms have been central to the spread of electoral disinformation. Across Africa, as in much of the world, platforms such as Facebook, TikTok, and X (formerly Twitter) have served as primary vehicles for the rapid dissemination of falsehoods, often facilitated by coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Data that we present in the report shows that, in South Africa, paid “nano-influencers”—individuals with small but loyal online followings—were mobilised to amplify misleading narratives in favour of specific political actors, demonstrating how disinformation strategies are evolving in response to changing digital landscapes. [...] In response to these findings, the report makes several key recommendations. First, it calls for greater cross-platform coordination among CSOs, fact-checking groups, and election monitors to ensure realtime responses to emerging disinformation threats. Second, it highlights the importance of media and digital literacy programmes among all age groups, including young voters, some of whom are often the most active on social media but may lack the skills to critically assess the credibility of information they encounter. Third, it urges greater transparency and accountability from technology platforms, which remain the primary distribution channels for electoral disinformation but have done little to curb its spread in African electoral contexts. Ultimately, electoral disinformation is not simply a digital challenge—it is a fundamental governance issue that shapes public perceptions of legitimacy and democratic participation. Evidence from the four elections in Africa that we examine in this report demonstrates that countering disinformation requires a multi-stakeholder approach that includes journalists, civil society actors, election commissions, and policymakers working collaboratively to strengthen information integrity and electoral transparency. The findings in this report offer both a diagnosis of the current disinformation landscape and a framework for more effective, evidence-based responses that can help safeguard future elections from manipulation." (Pages 9-10) more

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Hate Speech Events in India. Report 2025

Washington, DC: India Hate Lab (IHL); Center for the Study of Organized Hate (CSOH) (2025), 111 pp.

"India Hate Lab (IHL) documented 1,318 hate speech events targeting religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians, in 2025 across 21 states, one union territory, and the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi. On average, four hate speech events occurred per day. This marks a 13% incr ... more

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Psychological Defence and Information Influence: A Textbook on Theory and Practice

Jesper Falkheimer, James Pamment (eds.)

Karlstad: Psychological Defence Agency (2025), 257 pp.

"In an age defined by rapid information flows and shifting security landscapes, the resilience of societies rests not only on military strength or technological capacity, but equally on the ability of individuals and institutions to withstand psychological influence and manipulation. Psychological d ... more

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Nachrichten, Fake News und Wahlen

Uli Gleich

Media Perspektiven, issue 5 (2025), 10 pp.

"Voraussetzung dafür, dass (politische) Fake News Wirkung entfalten, sind gewisse Vulnerabilitätsfaktoren auf Seiten der Userinnen und User. Laut den Studien von Daunt und anderen (2023) sowie von Gupta und anderen (2023) gehören dazu zum Beispiel der Glaube an Verschwörungserzählungen, Patriot ... ismus, Konservatismus und die Tendenz zu kollektivistischen Ideen von Gesellschaft. Die Analysen von Schnaudt (2024) zeigen, dass Verschwörungserzählungen nicht nur in den USA, sondern auch in den europäischen Ländern eine Herausforderung für demokratische Prozesse (z. B. Wahlen) darstellen, wenn Menschen die falschen Informationen für glaubwürdig halten. Auch Mauk und Grömping (2024) fanden in ihrer Studie heraus, dass Autoritarismus und Verschwörungsmentalität, also die Neigung, sich die Welt über Verschwörungstheorien zu erklären, das Vertrauen in Wahlen mindern, weil Informationen motiviert, das heißt in Richtung einer bestehenden Voreinstellung, verarbeitet werden. Fake News können diese motivierte Verarbeitung unterstützen und damit einen destabilisierenden Effekt erzeugen. Laut Stachofsky, Schaupp und Crossler (2023) besteht gerade bei Wählergruppen, die ihre Informationen aus Quellen beziehen, die häufig (politische) Fake News verbreiten, eine besondere Anfälligkeit, die Integrität von Wahlen in Zweifel zu ziehen. Besonders interessant ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Erkenntnis, dass die Herausforderung durch Falschinformationen und Verschwörungserzählungen ironischerweise gerade in denjenigen Ländern hoch ausgeprägt ist, in denen die Rahmenbedingungen für demokratische und unbeeinflusste Wahlen objektiv am günstigsten sind (vgl. auch die Studie von Vliegenthart und anderen, 2024). Und selbst wenn keine tatsächlichen Erkenntnisse über Anomalien bei der Durchführung von Wahlen vorliegen, können Informationen über die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Unregelmäßigkeiten die oben erwähnte motivierte Informationsverarbeitung in Gang setzten und das Vertrauen in die Integrität von Wahlen bedrohen (vgl. die Studie von Kuk, Lee und Rhee (2024)). Studien, die den direkten Einfluss von Fake News auf Wahlentscheidungen untersuchen, sind methodisch schwierig und selten zu finden. Iida und andere (2024) konnten nur geringe Effekte feststellen und betonen, dass eine entsprechende Wirkung eher bei Personen entsteht, die keine ausgeprägten politischen Überzeugungen haben und/oder politisch weniger gut informiert sind. Auch Cantarella, Fraccaroli und Volpe (2023) konnten nur kleine Effekte ermitteln, die jedoch signifikant zum Wahlergebnis zugunsten populistischer Parteien in Italien beigetragen haben." (Zusammenfassung, Seiten 1-2) more

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State-Sponsored Disinformation Around the Globe: How Politicians Deceive their Citizens

Martin Echeverría Victoria, Sara Garcia Santamaria, Daniel C. Hallin (eds.)

Oxford: Routledge (2025), xiii, 336 pp.

"This book explores the pervasive and globalised trajectory of domestic disinformation. It describes specific operations and general apparatuses of disinformation that are sponsored by the State institutions in several countries around the world, such as governments, political parties, and politicia ... more

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Digital Shadows: Deepfakes Used As Violence Against Women in Journalism and Politics During African Elections

Risper Akinyi, Josephine Miliza, Mwara Gichanga, Sarah Kiden et al.

Kibera: Tanda Community Network (2025), 77 pp.

"This report delves into the growing threat of deepfakes as a tool for technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TfGBV) against women in politics and journalism during elections across Africa. With increasing reliance on digital tools and artificial intelligence (AI), deepfakes pose a serious ri ... sk to democratic processes and the personal security of women in leadership roles. The report investigated how deepfakes and other forms of manipulated media contribute to TfGBV against women journalists and politicians in the context of elections in Ghana, Namibia, and Senegal. Both interviews and focus group discussions elicited responses from policymakers, journalists, technologists, and researchers. Deepfakes, which use AI to manipulate videos, audio, and images, are being weaponized to tarnish reputations, spread falsehoods, and harass women, often in the most public and vulnerable moments of their careers. Women in politics and journalism are particularly susceptible, as their visibility makes them prime targets for digital harassment and character assassination. This misuse of AI-generated content not only impacts their personal and professional lives but also threatens to silence women’s voices in public discourse, deterring other women from engaging in leadership roles. The report emphasizes the urgent need for comprehensive measures to address this issue. Key recommendations include: the enactment of specific deepfake legislation; public awareness campaigns to educate women in leadership about online safety and investment in AI detection technologies; strengthening support systems for victims of TfGBV and promoting responsible AI use are also critical to creating a safer, more inclusive digital environment for women; Collaborative efforts with international organizations and the expansion of media and digital literacy programs are suggested to bolster the nation's resilience against this evolving threat. By addressing the challenges posed by deepfakes and TfGBV, Ghana, Namibia, and Senegal can safeguard its democratic processes and promote gender equality in the political and media landscapes. The report calls for immediate action to protect women in leadership, ensuring that they can participate fully and fearlessly in the country's democratic development." (Executive summary) more

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Mapping a Surge of Disinformation in Africa

Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 13 (2024)

"Disinformation campaigns have targeted every region of the continent. At least 39 African countries have been the target of a specific disinformation campaign. Disinformation tends to be concentrated. Half of the countries subjected to disinformation (20 of the 39) have been targeted three or more ... times, up from just seven countries meeting that threshold in 2022. African countries experiencing conflict are subject to much greater levels of disinformation—facing a median of 5 campaigns– highlighting the connection between instability and disinformation. Countries confronting disinformation typically face multiple disinformation actors. At times, these actors amplify one another’s misleading narratives, while at others, they clash or stay in separate lanes. Nearly 60 percent of disinformation campaigns on the continent are foreign state-sponsored—with Russia, China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar as the primary sponsors. Russia continues to be the primary purveyor of disinformation in Africa, sponsoring 80 documented campaigns, targeting more than 22 countries. This represents nearly 40 percent of all disinformation campaigns in Africa. These 80 campaigns have reached many millions of users through tens of thousands of coordinated fake pages and posts. Aggressively leveraging disinformation is a mainstay of Russia’s use of irregular channels to gain influence in Africa. Russia has promulgated disinformation to undermine democracy in at least 19 African countries, contributingto the continent’s backsliding on this front. African elections provide prime opportunities for disinformation. Some employ mercenary disinfo-ops teams. One private Israeli group, dubbed “Team Jorge,” has reportedly implemented disinformation campaigns to disrupt over 20 African elections since 2015. Domestic actors have also increasingly integrated disinformation into their political playbooks, notably during Kenya’s 2022 and Nigeria’s 2023 election. African countries that uphold presidential term limits (i.e., those with stronger checks and balances) are less exposed to foreign sponsored disinformation, with an average of 1.5 campaigns compared to an average of over 3 campaigns for countries without term limits. This underscores the common aim of foreign disinformation to prop up authoritarian actors." (Highlights) more

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“Votes will not be counted”: Indian election disinformation ads and YouTube

Access Now; Global Witness (2024), 9 pp.

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Checking verifications during the 2022 Brazilian run-off election: How fact-checking organizations exposed falsehoods and contributed to the accuracy of the public debate

Regina Cazzamatta, Augusto Santos

Journalism, volume 25, issue 10 (2024), pp. 2022-2043

"This study observes content-related indicators of the editorial decisions made by factcheckers during the 2022 Brazilian run-off election. Specifically, it aims to investigate factcheckers’ outputs regarding verification genres, scrutinized actors, types of verified falsehoods, and inspected plat ... more

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Microtargeting, voters’ unawareness, and democracy

Freek van Gils, Wieland Müller, Jens Prüfer

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, issue ewae002 (2024), 20 pp.

"Recent technological developments have raised concerns about threats to democracy because of their potential to distort election outcomes: (a) data-driven voter research enabling political microtargeting and (b) growing news consumption via social media and news aggregators that obfuscate the origi ... more

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Social media and mis/disinformation in electoral context in the DRC

Pierre N'sana, Patient Ligodi, Pierre Bahati Ndamwenge et al.

USAID; FHI 360; Internews (2024), 57 pp.

"This paper aimed to address some of the gaps in knowledge about the nature of mis/disinformation and hate speech in WhatsApp groups, as well as the mechanisms through which those messages are identified, perceived, and relayed by users. Through quantitative and qualitative study of activities in 15 ... more

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Exploring Disinformation in Fragile States: Iraq as a Case Study of Influence of International Political Actors

Rawand Faeq

Tokyo: Toda Peace Institute (2023), 18 pp.

"This paper examines the influence of international political actors in perpetuating disinformation in fragile states, using Iraq as a case study. The advent of modern technology and social media has transformed the global information landscape, providing new avenues for the dissemination of disinfo ... more

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Information Integrity to Sustain Peace during Electoral Processes. Sustaining Peace during Electoral Processes (SELECT) Project

New York: UNDP (2023), 48 pp.

"The purpose of this report is to gain a better understanding of the pertinent dynamics and to bolster the design of programming to support the information ecosystem around elections. In aid of this, UNDP sought information through a number of channels, in a review of the relevant literature, a seri ... more

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Survey on the impact of online disinformation and hate speech
Deep Insights

Paris: UNESCO; Ipsos (2023), 35 slides

"On average in the 16 countries surveyed, 56% of internet users frequently use social media to stay informed about current events, far ahead of television (44%). However, it is worth noting that differences exist among population groups: television is the primary source in the most developed countri ... more

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Towards a model that measures the impact of disinformation on elections

Jonáš Syrovátka, Nikola Horejš, Sarah Komasová

European View, volume 22, issue 1 (2023), pp. 119-130

"Disinformation represents a danger to the integrity and legitimacy of the electoral process. From our research based on the 2021 Czech parliamentary elections, we introduce a model for measuring the resilience of citizens to disinformation. This model is then used to draw conclusions about the impa ... more

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State-Sponsored Online Disinformation: Impact on Electoral Integrity in Thailand

Korbkusol Neelapaichit, Ekmongkhon Puridej (eds.)

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2023), vii, 42 pp.

"[This publication] outlines how organised disinformation campaigns or Information Operations have become the latest variable to impact the quality of elections in the kingdom [...] Drawn from past evidence, the report identifies four forms of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns that are likely ... more

Disinformation: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis Deep Insights

Tackling Disinformation, Information Manipulation and Interference in Four African Elections Deep Insights

Survey on the impact of online disinformation and hate speech Deep Insights

Disinformation: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis
Deep Insights

Tackling Disinformation, Information Manipulation and Interference in Four African Elections
Deep Insights

Survey on the impact of online disinformation and hate speech
Deep Insights