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Climate Disinformation in Thailand: Negating Indigenous Peoples’ Identity

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2025), viii, 60 pp.

"This report examines how climate disinformation reinforces the systemic negation of Indigenous People's (IP) identity, undermining traditional practices, weakening advocacy for rights and obstructing inclusive climate and forest governance by making three key contributions. First, it identifies fou ... r distinct forms of climate disinformation in Thailand: one-sided reporting, where the media spotlights government and corporate initiatives while omitting their social and environmental harms, whether due to political pressure or economic incentives; greenwashing, where corporations exaggerate or misrepresent their sustainability practices to obscure their ongoing environmentally destructive activities; false climate solutions promoted as climate action which fails to address the root causes of climate change while leaving IP communities socially and economically disadvantaged; scapegoating of IPs where Indigenous communities are falsely portrayed as primary drivers of deforestation, legitimising displacement and marginalisation. Second, it demonstrates four ways in which climate disinformation harms IPs, each reinforcing the negation of their identities: exclusion from decision-making: by either barring their participation outright or dismissing their inputs in decision-making processes, IPs’ Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is removed thereby negating their identities as owners and stewards of their land; criminalisation: the strategic misuse of “climate change” laws to negate IP identity and erase the legitimacy of IPs’ traditions and practices in environmental stewardship; and the use of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) intimidate advocates for challenging climate disinformation; forced evictions: conservation and development narratives justify deterritorialisation that severs spiritual, cultural and economic ties to ancestral lands which forms the core of IPs’ identities; intimidation and violence: harassment, threats and attacks undermining the capacity of IPs to resist projects and actions that harm them, their environment and their way of life. Third, to address climate disinformation and safeguard Indigenous Peoples’ (IPs) rights and identities in Thailand, this report outlines a list of multi-stakeholder recommendations: UN bodies should integrate climate disinformation into their human rights monitoring and climate action frameworks and provide guidance to Thailand on implementing its international obligations; the Thai government should embed safeguards against climate disinformation into national climate and environmental policies, strengthen legal protections for IPs, ensure meaningful participation of IP communities in decision-making and improve transparency and accountability in environmental governance; international NGOs (INGOs) should collaborate with IP organisations to map, document and respond to climate disinformation, provide sustained technical capacity-building and funding, and support advocacy and litigation to defend IP rights; civil society organisations (CSOs) should monitor disinformation targeting IPs, co-develop counter-narratives with IP communities and educational content to empower both IPs and the broader public and expand legal aid support; the media sector should prioritise constructive and investigative journalism on climate, environmental, and IP issues; expand coverage in Indigenous languages and culturally appropriate formats; collaborate with IP organisations on fact-checking and monitoring disinformation; and amplify Indigenous perspectives through both national and international outlets; technology companies should strengthen content moderation against climate disinformation, flag misleading project information and invest in digital literacy and connectivity initiatives for rural and Indigenous communities; indigenous communities and organisations should build monitoring networks to identify and counter disinformation, strengthen alliances with independent and Indigenous media, conduct and participate in capacity-building workshops and use digital tools to amplify their voices and safeguard knowledge." (Executive summary, pages vi-vii) more

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Climate Disinformation in India: Subverting Indigenous Peoples’ Identity

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2025), viii, 55 pp.

"The report makes three key contributions: it identifies the main forms of climate disinformation in India, examines their specific impacts on indigenous peoples (IP) communities and sets out targeted policy recommendations for national and international stakeholders. First, four forms of climate di ... sinformation circulating in the media landscape in India are identified: one-sided coverage, where the media circulate disinformation by the state, by highlighting false ecological progress while omitting data on biodiversity loss, environmental impacts and displacement; promoting false climate solutions, like afforestation and green credit programmes, which are dubbed as climate action despite their harmful ecological impacts and effects on IPs; attributing environmental disasters to climate change, where state authorities deflect accountability for disasters arising from governance failures and poor infrastructure to climate change; denialism of climate change and its causes, which relies on the suppression of scientific data, promotion of anti-renewable myths and the institutional erasure of climate-linked mortality, thereby sowing doubt and enabling the deflection of accountability. Second, the report shows that the deliberate circulation of climate disinformation in the media subverts IPs’ rights and legal safeguards in favour of state and corporate interests in five critical ways: bypassing IPs’ rights to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) by deliberately spreading distorted information effectively marginalising IP voices from environmental decision-making; restricting traditional practices by promoting false state initiatives while claiming environmental legitimacy, thereby worsening climate adaptation and livelihoods; undermining IPs’ forest conservation efforts, through the reframing of unsustainable top-down conservation efforts as climate action, thus enabling the loss of biocultural diversity; forced evictions and deterritorialisation, often enabled by the misrepresentation of environmental data in judicial rulings under the guise of ecological progress; legal persecution, Intimidation and physical violence, where IPs and environmental defenders are subjected to both online harassment and militarised control in order to suppress resistance to state or corporate projects. Third, this report outlines a set of recommendations for action: United Nations (UN) bodies should conduct an audit of India's compliance with IPs’ rights, investigate how state and corporate disinformation facilitates violations and support the ratification of relevant international laws and conventions; the government should strengthen legal safeguards for IPs by providing greater technical and administrative support to effectively implement the Forest Rights Act, ensuring robust FPIC protocols in all climate and development projects; international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) should support Indigenous-led audits of government programmes, submit evidence of digital surveillance to UN bodies, and help establish rapid-response legal networks and community fact-checking hubs in IP languages; civil society organisations (CSOs) should establish a national database for eco-development displacements, offer mobile legal clinics for land rights and advocate for policies requiring IPs’ representation in environmental bodies; the media sector should expose data manipulation in official forest reports, establish Indigenous-language fact-checking and leverage public broadcasting to boost digital literacy and amplify community voices; technology companies should develop tools to detect disinformation targeting IPs, conduct transparent audits of algorithmic bias on their platforms and partner with CSOs to provide digital literacy and secure communication tools; IP communities should continue to document land-use violations using community mapping, file collective petitions to audit projects violating their rights and build alliances to establish Indigenous-owned media platforms to control narratives." (Executive summary, pages vi-vii) more

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Online Content Regulation in the Asia-Pacific: Limiting Civil Society’s Capacity to Hold Governments Accountable

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2024), v, 37 pp.

"Governments have updated penal codes and national security laws, enacted fake news and cybersecurity laws as well as laws that govern internet service providers and technology companies. These laws have widely been used to block and remove online content that call out blind spots in government poli ... cies and to intimidate and prosecute these content creators through hefty fines and jail time. Efforts to hold political office holders and government officials accountable for their policies are increasingly penalised. These government actions have significantly impacted civil society actors in numerous ways. First, individuals and organisations utilising the online sphere to hold government officials and policies accountable have come under intense scrutiny, resulting in the criminalisation of critics and the blocking and removal of online content deemed sensitive by state authorities. Second, the effectiveness of civil society in holding governments accountable is compromised, as state authorities routinely direct internet service providers and technology companies to block or remove online content considered sensitive or illegal. Consequently, individuals and organisations increasingly find their digital content at risk of being blocked or removed, succumbing to government directives to internet service providers and technology companies. This diminishes civil society’s calls for accountability. Third, on several instances, governments have imposed internet shutdowns - particularly during elections and politically sensitive periods - to disrupt the information flow. Ultimately, this has limited civil society’s ability to send and receive communications effectively to mobilise people to hold governments publicly accountable during politically important instances. Fourth, troll ng has surfaced as a mainstream strategy to harass and intimidate individuals and organisations who seek to hold governments accountable. Typically orchestrated by organised groups or cybertroopers, these digital attacks increasingly involve online hate speech directed at women who call out blindspots in government policies. Fifth, the ways of working of INGOs and CSOs have changed, leading many organisations to restrict the scope and assertiveness of their communications to shield themselves from government retribution and trolling. Some entities have opted to remove the visibility of their organisations, incorporating measures such as disallowing the use of their logos or the publishing of videos, photos and text by local partners in order to distance themselves from particular activities and contents of knowledge products. Given these developments, the principal recommendation is that key stakeholders, including international organisations, governments, ISPs and technology companies, and civil society actors, should recognise that criticism of government policies and officials is a legitimate activity and a vital form of expression for civil society. Hence, any measures, whether legal or non-legal, that interfere with or criminalise this legitimate activity should be rescinded or disallowed. Instead, measures should be put in place to ensure that civil society is empowered to call out the blind spots in government policies." (Executive summary) more

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Internet Freedoms in Malaysia: Regulating Online Discourse on Race, Religion, and Royalty

Bangkok: Asia Centre (2023), 49 pp.

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Restrictions on Internet Freedoms: Recommendations for Thai Policy-Makers and Civil Society

Bangkok: Asia Centre (2023), 16 pp.

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State-Sponsored Online Disinformation: Impact on Electoral Integrity in Thailand

Korbkusol Neelapaichit, Ekmongkhon Puridej (eds.)

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2023), vii, 42 pp.

"[This publication] outlines how organised disinformation campaigns or Information Operations have become the latest variable to impact the quality of elections in the kingdom [...] Drawn from past evidence, the report identifies four forms of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns that are likely ... more

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Digital Security and Human Rights Defenders in the Asia-Pacific

James Gomez, Marc Piñol Rovira et al.

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2023), 47 pp.

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Political Hate Sites in Singapore: Flourishing Without Repercussions

Ekmongkhon Puridej

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2023), 60 pp.

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Digital Security and Human Rights Defenders Landscape: Recommendations for NHRIs in the Asia-Pacific

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2023), 22 pp.

"Governments in the Asia-Pacific region have responded to human rights defenders' (HRD’s) new online advocacy strategies, affecting their online advocacy through the use of legal and non-legal measures to harass them and impede their work. Against this backdrop, National Human Rights Institutions ... more

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Media Freedom in Southeast Asia: Repeal Restrictive Laws, Strengthen Quality Journalism

Bangkok: Asia Centre; Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2022), 41 pp.

"This report proposes solutions on how best to equip journalists and other key actors to fulfil their vital role in a changing landscape. While censorship is an alluring option in the face of disinformation over the internet, it is important to find avenues to facilitate the responsible and ethical ... more

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Youth and Disinformation in Malaysia: Strengthening Electoral Integrity

Korbkusol Neelapaichit, Ekmongkhon Puridej, Pemtat Chanhom (ed.)

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2022), vii, 44 pp.

"In 2022, internet penetration and social platform usage reached an all-time high – 43.4% of the total population who use the internet are youth aged between 15-24 years. Youth voters have explicitly become a major target of political parties and their campaign messages. We can expect social media ... more

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Internet Freedoms in Thailand

Bangkog: Asia Centre (2022), iv, 29 pp.

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Myanmar Coup and Internet Shutdowns

Asia Centre (2021), 8 pp.

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Harmony Laws in Southeast Asia: Majority Dominance, Minority Repression

Bangkok: Asia Centre; Association for Progressive Communications (APC) (2021), 63 pp.

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Myanmar Coup and Internet Shutdowns

Asia Centre (2021), 15 pp.

"Asia Centre’s Briefing Note, Myanmar Coup and Internet Shutdowns, tracks the period 1 February to 31 March 2021. The Note provides a timeline of the shutdowns, reactions from protestors, technology companies and the international community, legal analysis of key laws and Myanmar’s international ... more

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Climate Disinformation in Thailand: Negating Indigenous Peoples’ Identity

Climate Disinformation in India: Subverting Indigenous Peoples’ Identity

Online Content Regulation in the Asia-Pacific: Limiting Civil Society’s Capacity to Hold Governments Accountable

Internet Freedoms in Malaysia: Regulating Online Discourse on Race, Religion, and Royalty

Restrictions on Internet Freedoms: Recommendations for Thai Policy-Makers and Civil Society

State-Sponsored Online Disinformation: Impact on Electoral Integrity in Thailand

Digital Security and Human Rights Defenders in the Asia-Pacific

Political Hate Sites in Singapore: Flourishing Without Repercussions

Digital Security and Human Rights Defenders Landscape: Recommendations for NHRIs in the Asia-Pacific

Media Freedom in Southeast Asia: Repeal Restrictive Laws, Strengthen Quality Journalism

Youth and Disinformation in Malaysia: Strengthening Electoral Integrity

Internet Freedoms in Thailand

Myanmar Coup and Internet Shutdowns

Harmony Laws in Southeast Asia: Majority Dominance, Minority Repression

Myanmar Coup and Internet Shutdowns

Myanmar: Dismantling Dissent. Crackdowns on Internet Freedoms

Timor Leste: Internet Freedoms under Threat

"Infodemic" and SDGs: Internet Freedoms in Southeast Asia

Internet Freedoms in Cambodia: A Gateway to Control

Hate Speech in Southeast Asia: New Forms, Old Rules